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Of Evidence and Equal Protection: The
Unconstitutionality of Excluding
Government Agents' Statements Offered
as Vicarious Admissions Against the
Prosecution
Edward J. Imwinkelried*
Scholars have continually faulted American evidence law
for its inconsistencies.1 The commentators have leveled espe-
cially harsh accusations against the inconsistencies in the hear-
say doctrine.2 In the words of a leading critic, Professor
Kenneth Culp Davis, one of the most irrational features of con-
temporary hearsay doctrine is that "technically incompetent ev-
idence is often more reliable than technically competent
evidence."3
Federal Rule of Evidence 801 defines hearsay as "a state-
ment, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at
the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of
the matter asserted."'4 Under this definition, some out-of-court
statements do not constitute hearsay. A statement falls within
the hearsay definition only if the proponent offers the state-
ment for a hearsay purpose, that is, to prove the truth of the
assertion in the statement.5 The proponent of testimony about
* Professor of Law, University of California at Davis. The author would
like to express special thanks to Mr. Lorenzo Formoso, class of 1987, Univer-
sity of California at Davis Law School. Mr. Formoso not only served as the
author's research assistant on this project, he also contributed numerous sug-
gestions that significantly improved the final manuscript.
1. E.g., Davis, Evidence Reform: The Administrative Process Leads the
Way, 34 MINN. L. REV. 581, 608 (1950) ("Whether or not evidence is 'reliable,
probative, and substantial' depends largely on factors having nothing to do
with the reasons behind the rules of competence.").
2. E.g., Ladd, The Hearsay We Admit, 5 OKLA. L. REV. 271 (1952); Wein-
stein, Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 IoWA L. REv. 331 (1961).
3. Davis, supra note 1, at 608. See also Imwinkelried, The Scope of the
Residual Hearsay Exceptions in the Federal Rules of Evidence, 15 SAN DIEGO
L. REv. 239, 262-63 (1978) (quoting Davis, supra note 1, at 608).
4. FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
5. See id.
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an out-of-court statement can defeat a hearsay objection by of-
fering the statement for a nonhearsay purpose, that is, a pur-
pose that does not require an inference of the truth of the
assertion.6
Although evidence offered for a hearsay purpose is gener-
ally inadmissible,7 the hearsay rule has numerous exceptions.8
Courts, pursuant to the Federal Rules of Evidence, recognize
exceptions to the rule when the proffered statement falls
within the spirit as well as the letter of the rule, if there is both
a circumstantial guarantee of the trustworthiness of the state-
ment and some necessity for resorting to the hearsay.9
Courts also acknowledge exemptions from the hearsay rule
when the statement falls within the letter but not the spirit of
the hearsay definition. Perhaps the foremost exemption is the
doctrine that an out-of-court admission of a party-opponent is
nonhearsay.10 Some argue that this exemption is a by-product
of the adversary system of litigation.' 1 According to this argu-
ment, the hearsay rule's principal purpose is to afford the oppo-
nent an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. It makes
little sense, therefore, to include a party-opponent's own decla-
6. See R. CARLSON, E. IMWINKELRIED & E. KIONKA, MATERIALS FOR THE
STUDY OF EVIDENCE 427-32 (1983); Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 HARv. L.
REV. 957, 958-61 (1974).
7. See FED. R. EvID. 802.
8. For a list of the statutorily recognized exceptions, see FED. R. EVID.
803, 804.
9. See, e.g., E. CLEARY, MCCORAUCK ON EVIDENCE § 253, at 753-58 (3d ed.
1984) (discussing situations in which a witness is unavailable to testify and it
becomes necessary to admit evidence in exception to the hearsay rule) [herein-
after McCoRMICK]. The Federal Rules of Evidence permit courts to recognize
other exceptions by stating that a statement otherwise excluded by the rule
against hearsay will not be excluded if it is
not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court
determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material
fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is
offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure
through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these
rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of
the statement into evidence.
FED. R. EVID. 803(24), 804(b)(5).
10. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).
11. See R. CARLSON, E. IMWINKELRIED & E. KIONKA, supra note 6, at 437(quoting Dean McCormick, C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EvI-
DENCE 629 (2d ed. 1972)); Mueller, The Federal Coconspirator Eception " Ac-
tion, Assertion, and Hearsay, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 323, 333 (1984); but see Bein,
Parties'Admissions, Agents'Admissions: Hearsay Wolves in Sheep's Clothing,
12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 393, 419 (1984).
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rations within the hearsay definition because that person is free
to take the stand to deny or explain away the declaration.12
At common law and under the Federal Rules of Evidence,
the admissions doctrine applies to both the party-opponent's
own statements and to statements made by third parties, such
as the party-opponent's agents, who are closely connected with
the party-opponent. 13 Statements made by third parties but ad-
mitted against the opponent because of his close relationship
with the third party are customarily termed vicarious admis-
sions.14 Vicarious admissions are admitted against the party-op-
ponent on the theory that, given the party's close relationship
with the third party, it is fair to impute the statement to the
party-opponent.1 5
In criminal cases, the vicarious admission doctrine has
evolved in a peculiar, contradictory fashion. Courts have been
liberal to the point of irresponsibility in treating statements by
a defendant's alleged co-conspirators as vicarious admissions re-
ceivable against the defendant. 16 Suppose, however, that a
criminal defendant attempts to offer into evidence a statement
made by a police officer or prosecutor. In most jurisdictions,
the statement is almost automatically inadmissible. Courts rig-
idly adhere to the view that the statement cannot qualify as a
vicarious admission by the prosecuting sovereign.17
12. Bein, supra note 11, at 419 (quoting E.M. MORGAN, BASIc PROBLEMS
OF EVIDENCE 266 (1963)).
13. See FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(A)-(E); R. CARLSON, E. IMVINKELRIED &
E. KIONKA, supra note 6, at 437-49 (discussing personal admissions, adoptive
admissions, and vicarious admissions and noting the academic distinction be-
tween the common law rule, under which such admissions are hearsay but ad-
missible under a special exception, and the Federal Rules of Evidence, under
which such admissions are not hearsay).
14. See R. CARLsON, E. IMwINKELRIED & E. KIONKA, supra note 6, at 438,
444 (distinguishing an "adoptive" admission, in which the opponent manifests
some agreement to the statement, and a "vicarious" admission, which is im-
puted to the party-opponent regardless of any manifestation of agreement be-
cause of the opponent's legal relationship to the declarant).
15. Id. at 445 (stating that, historically, agency theory was the basis for ad-
missibility); Mueller, supra note 11, at 333 ("It is fair to receive in evidence
against each alleged conspirator the furthering statements of others because in
joining the venture each impliedly authorizes the others to speak, and so as-
sumes the risk of the consequences.").
16. For a discussion of the misplaced confidence prosecutors and courts
place on alleged co-conspirators' statements, see infra text accompanying
notes 33-50.
17. E.g., United States v. Santos, 372 F.2d 177 (2d Cir. 1977); see generally
Younger, Sovereign Admissions: A Comment on United States v. Santos, 43
N.Y.U. L. REV. 108 (1968) (criticizing the Second Circuit's disparate application
of the admissions doctrine in criminal cases).
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This Article examines the validity of this inconsistency in
the vicarious admissions doctrine under the equal protection
clause. While analyzing this inconsistency, the Article also ad-
dresses the question whether the equal protection doctrine can
be used effectively to regulate the consistency and coherence of
evidence law. To date, litigants rarely have invoked the equal
protection doctrine when challenging the validity of evidentiary
rules. In the handful of cases addressing equal protection chal-
lenges, courts typically reject the argument without any ex-
tended analysis. "8 A few commentators have raised the
possibility of equal protection attacks on particular evidentiary
rules, 19 including aspects of the hearsay doctrine. 20 Although
these commentators have concluded that the equal protection
clause invalidates the particular rules they were attacking,
their analyses of the clause's application are as summary as
those in the cases brushing aside equal protection challenges.
The net result is a gap in the literature on the application
of the equal protection doctrine to evidentiary rules. The gap is
anomalous. In recent years, the Supreme Court has invalidated
evidentiary rules on a number of constitutional rationales, in-
cluding the express sixth amendment confrontation guaran-
tee2 l and an implied sixth amendment right to present defense
evidence.2 2 The judiciary's failure to resort to the equal protec-
18. E.g., Skinner v. Cardwell, 564 F.2d 1381, 1390-91 (9th Cir. 1977) (up-holding Arizona's rule permitting the "calling party to impeach its own wit-
ness by introducing prior inconsistent statements as substantive proof" but
denying the same right to the opposing party), cert denied, 435 U.S. 1009(1978); Conway v. Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, 525 F.2d 927, 931 (5th Cir.
1976) (upholding a Texas statute that permitted evidence of a ceremonial mar-
riage in a wrongful death action, but did not permit evidence of a common-law
marriage); Kuhl v. Commonwealth, 497 S.W.2d 710, 712-13 (Ky. 1973) (categor-ically stating that the defendant was not denied equal protection or due pro-
cess by the trial court's refusal to admit opinion testimony offered solely to
encourage the jury to mitigate the punishment).
19. E.g., Bray, Evidence of Prior Uncharged Offenses and the Growth ofConstitutional Restrictions, 28 U. MiAmi L. REv. 489, 503-04 (1974); Note, Con-
stitutional Problems Inherent in the Admissibility of Prior Record Convic-
tions Evidence for the Purpose of Impeaching the Credibility of the Defendant
Witness, 37 U. CIN. L. REv. 168, 179 (1968).
20. E.g., Tague, Perils of the Rulemaking Process: The Development, Ap-plication, and Unconstitutionality of Rule 804(b)(3)'s Penal Interest Excep-
tion, 69 GEo. L.J. 851, 989, 996 (1981).
21. E.g., Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 319-20 (1974) (finding that a state
law which protected the anonymity of juvenile offenders and limited their tes-
timony in court denied the defendant in a burglary case his sixth amendment
right to confront witnesses).
22. E.g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973) (criminal de-
fendant's implied sixth amendment right to present defense evidence was im-
[Vol. 71:269
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tion clause is surprising. Before World War II the equal protec-
tion clause was "a dubious weapon in the armory of judicial
review" and languished through "eighty years of relative desue-
tude.' ' 23 After the close of World War II, however, the clause
underwent a dramatic rejuvenation. Since that time, the
Supreme Court has frequently and vigorously used the clause
to strike down laws restricting human and civil rights.24 The
equal protection guarantee has become "the single most impor-
tant concept in the Constitution for the protection of individual
rights."25 It is now "the ultimate haven of human rights."
26
Part I of this Article demonstrates the differential eviden-
tiary treatment of co-conspirators' and government agents'
statements. Parts II-IV then present a critical evaluation of the
difference under the equal protection doctrine. Part II argues
that the differential treatment amounts to a classification, trig-
gering the equal protection guarantee. Part III further con-
tends that the classification should be subject to an
intermediate level of judicial scrutiny. Under this level of scru-
tiny, the classification should be upheld if it is substantially re-
lated to achieving an important government interest. Part IV
considers whether such a relationship exists. The Article con-
cludes that the classification is insufficiently related to any im-
portant government interest for the differential treatment to
withstand equal protection scrutiny.
I. THE DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF STATEMENTS
BY CO-CONSPIRATORS AND GOVERNMENT
AGENTS UNDER THE VICARIOUS
ADMISSION DOCTRINE
A. THE LIBERAL ADMSSIBImTY OF CO-CONSPIRATOR
STATEMENTS
Defendant A is on trial. The prosecution calls Witness B to
permissibly diminished by Mississippi's common law rule that a party may not
impeach his own witness); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23 (1967) (holding
that the defendant in a criminal case had been denied his sixth amendment
compulsory process rights because the state arbitrarily denied him the right to
place on the witness stand a competent witness with testimony relevant and
material to the defendant).
23. Tussmen & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L.
REV. 341, 341 (1949).
24. Id. at 373; J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONsTITUTIONAL LAW
585 (2d ed. 1983).
25. J. NoWAc, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 24, at 585.
26. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 23, at 364.
1986]
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the stand. Witness B is prepared to testify that Declarant C
made an assertive, out-of-court statement incriminating A. If
the prosecution offers the statement as proof of the truth of the
assertion in the statement, the statement falls within the hear-
say definition.2 7 If the prosecution can demonstrate that A and
C were co-conspirators, however, and that the statement in
question furthered the conspiracy, the statement may be admis-
sible under the co-conspirator doctrine.
The Supreme Court first recognized the co-conspirator doc-
trine in 1827 in the Gooding opinion authored by Justice
Story.28 The Federal Rules of Evidence set out a contemporary
version of the doctrine: "A statement is not hearsay if... the
statement is offered against a party and is... a statement by a
coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of
the conspiracy." 29
The co-conspirator doctrine requires the prosecutor to es-
tablish several preliminary facts as foundation for admitting a
co-conspirator's statement as a vicarious admission against a
criminal defendant. In most jurisdictions, the prosecutor must
present independent evidence of both the conspiracy's existence
and the defendant's membership in the conspiracy.30 In addi-
tion, the "pendency" requirement requires the prosecutor to
show that the co-conspirator made the statement while the con-
spiracy was pending.31 Lastly, the doctrine imposes a purpose
limitation; the prosecutor must demonstrate that the co-con-
spirator made the statement to further the conspiracy's
objectives.32
At first blush, these foundational requirements appear to
be impressive insurance that any statement admitted under the
co-conspirator doctrine will be reliable evidence. Closer analy-
sis reveals, however, that the foundational requirements are il-
lusory guarantees of reliability.33 Even out-of-court statements
27. See FED. R. EviD. 801(c).
28. United States v. Gooding, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 460 (1827).
29. FED. R. EviD. 801(d)(2)(E). The co-conspirator doctrine is one of sev-
eral hearsay exemptions which together are called vicarious admissions. See
supra notes 13-14.
30. See, e.g., CAL. EvID. CODE § 1223 (West 1966); Oakley, From Hearsay
to Eternity: Pendency and the Co-Conspirator Exception in California-Fac4
Fiction, and a Novel Approach, 16 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1, 7-9 (1975) (discuss-
ing two California cases interpreting CAL. EviD. CODE § 1223 which governs
the admissibility of co-conspirators' statements).
31. Mueller, supra note 11, at 331.
32. Id
33. See Note, Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) and the Confronta
274 [Vol. 71:269
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that satisfy the foundational requirements can be "quite" or
"extremely" untrustworthy.3 4 Students of hearsay law have as-
serted that despite the seemingly rigorous foundational require-
ments, co-conspirator statements are generally less reliable
than statements falling within any of the hearsay exceptions, 3 5
including the often-criticized dying declaration exception.3 6
Professor Christopher Mueller put the matter bluntly but aptly
when he wrote that the co-conspirator doctrine is "an
embarrassment." 37
The general unreliability of co-conspirator statements is
understandable in light of the specific weaknesses of this type
of evidence. The basic theoretical justification for admitting
the statements is that in an adversary litigation system, a party
cannot complain about the introduction of statements made by
third parties closely associated with him.3 8 That justification,
however, is unrelated to any consideration of the inherent
trustworthiness of the evidence.3 9
Co-conspirator statements are riddled with the very weak-
nesses the hearsay rule is designed to guard against. Hearsay is
distrusted principally because its use prevents cross-examina-
tion of the out-of-court declarant.40 By safeguarding the oppor-
tunity to cross-examine, the rule helps ensure that the opposing
attorney will be able to expose latent deficiencies in the declar-
ant's perception, narration, sincerity and memory.41 Yet a
grave risk of misperception arises whenever a judge admits a
co-conspirator's statement.42 The communication among co-
tion Clause: Closing the Window of Admissibility for Coconspirator Hearsay,
53 FORDHAM L. REV. 1291, 1332 (1985) ("Coconspirator statements, however,
almost never provide sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness apart from pro-
ducing the declarant and testing the veracity of his statement.").
34. Davenport, The Confrontation Clause and the Co-Conspirator Excep-
tion in Criminal Prosecutions: A Functional Analysis, 85 HARV. L. REv.
1378, 1387 (1972) ("quite"); Comment, The Hearsay Exception for Co-Conspira-
tors' Declarations, 25 U. CHa. L. REV. 530, 541 (1958) ("extremely").
35. Note, Reconciling the Conflict Between the Coconspirator Exemption
from the Hearsay Rule and the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendmen
85 COLUMi. L. REv. 1294, 1312 (1985).
36. Note, supra note 33, at 1313 & n.135.
37. Mueller, supra note 11, at 324.
38. Id. at 333.
39. Davenport, supra note 34, at 1384; Note, supra note 35, at 1304-05.
40. Wheaton, What is Hearsay?, 46 IoWA L. REv. 210, 222 (1961); see Mc-
COFmICK, supra note 9, § 245, at 728 (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149,
158 (1970); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965)).
41. R. CARLSON, E. ImWImKELRIED & E. KIONKA, supra note 6, at 421.
42. See Note, supra note 33, at 1311-12 (describing the various ways co-
conspirators might misperceive the others' role in the conspiracy).
1986]
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conspirators is often limited,43 especially when the conspiracy is
national or international in scope. A given conspirator may
have little 44 or incomplete knowledge about the defendant.45
The co-conspirator need not be acquainted with the defend-
ant.46 The danger of misperception is particularly acute in the
case of peripheral conspirators.47 Similarly, narrative problems
exist because conspirators frequently use code words to com-
municate.48 Finally, the risks of insincerity are mammoth. The
conspirator may be an inveterate liar accustomed to bending
the truth.49 It may well be in the conspirator's self-interest to
misrepresent the membership or aims of the conspiracy.50
Unfortunately, the foundational prerequisites to applica-
tion of the co-conspirator doctrine are not a panacea for these
weaknesses in co-conspirator statements.51 Independent proof
of the conspiracy and the defendant's membership in it affords
scant assurance of reliability. The prevailing view is that the
independent proof may be "slight."5 2 Courts evaluate the suffi-
ciency of the independent proof in such a relaxed fashion that
one commentator has charged that "the independent evidence
requirement is not so much a requirement as an excuse" to ad-
mit conspirators' statements with flimsy corroboration.5 3
For its part, the pendency requirement does little to elimi-
nate possible sources of error in conspirators' statements. Many
state courts apply the pendency requirement laxly.5 Moreover,
the only testimonial quality on which the requirement has any
appreciable, helpful impact is memory.55
Similarly, some courts make short shrift of the furtherance
43. Davenport, supra note 34, at 1392.
44. Comment, supra note 34, at 539.
45. Note, supra note 35, at 1308.
46. Comment, supra note 34, at 539.
47. Id.
48. Note, supra note 33, at 1311.
49. Levie, Hearsay and Conspiracy: A Reexamination of the Co-Conspira-
tors' Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 52 MIcH. L. REv. 1159, 1166 (1954) ("It is
no victory for common sense to make a belief that criminals are notorious for
their veracity a basis for law.").
50. Id at 1165-66.
51. Davenport, supra note 34, at 1388-89.
52. Id at 1388.
53. Id.
54. See Levie, supra note 49, at 1175 & nn.80-83 (citing, as examples, cases
from Georgia, Ohio, Oregon and Kentucky).
55. Note, supra note 33, at 1312 ("Only the memory factor of reliability is
somewhat ensured by Rule 801(d)(2)(E), because the rule requires that the
statement have been made during the course of the conspiracy.").
[Vol. 71:269
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requirement and pay it only lip service.5 6 Even if a court takes
the requirement seriously, the requirement does not ensure
that the statement is true or the speaker truthful. To induce
an outsider to join the conspiracy, the conspirator may lie to
make the conspiracy seem stronger than it is.57 The conspira-
tor may exaggerate the defendant's role in the conspiracy58 or
name the defendant as a conspirator although the defendant is
not a participant at all.59 Hence, a conspirator's statement may
further the conspiracy even when the statement is untrue.60 In
sum, even considered together, the foundational requirements
for conspirator statements fail to circumstantially guarantee
the statement's trustworthiness. 6 '
56. E.g., United States v. Miller, 664 F.2d 94, 98 (5th Cir. 1981) (In ac-
cepting that a co-conspirator's statement was made in furtherance of the con-
spiracy, the court stated, "This Court has noted that the 'in furtherance of the
conspiracy' standard must not be applied too strictly, 'lest we defeat the pur-
pose of the exception.' "), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 854 (1982). For further discus-
sion of the cursory application of the furtherance requirement, see generally
Levie, supra note 49, at 1167-72; Morgan, The Rationale of Vicarious Admis-
sions, 42 HARV. L. REV. 461, 464-66 (1929); Mueller, supra note 11, at 357; Com-
ment, supra note 34, at 531 n.5.
57. Davenport, supra note 34, at 1396.
58. Note, supra note 35, at 1309-10.
59. Davenport, supra note 34, at 1396.
60. Mueller, supra note 11, at 357.
61. See generally Davenport, supra note 34, at 1384-91 (analyzing the reli-
ability of the co-conspirator exception). To make matters worse for the de-
fense, prosecutors are now attempting to circumvent even the minimal
foundational requirements of the co-conspirator doctrine. In addition to codi-
fying the co-conspirator doctrine in Rule 801(d)(2)(E), the Federal Rules of
Evidence set out two other applications of the vicarious admission doctrine:
A statement is not hearsay if. .. [t]he statement is offered against a
party and is ... (C) a statement by a person authorized by him to
make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by his
agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of his agency or
employment, made during the existence of the relationship ....
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(C)-(D). Courts typically invoke these doctrines in civil
cases. See FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory committee note. By their terms, how-
ever, (C) and (D) are not limited to civil actions. Seizing on the literal terms
of the statutes, prosecutors have begun to argue that (C) and (D) apply in
prosecutions as well and that they constitute alternative theories for admitting
co-conspirator statements. See, e.g., United States v. Weisz, 718 F.2d 413, 433
(D.C. Cir. 1983) (co-conspirators' statements admissible against defendant
whether or not a conspiracy is charged), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1027, cert de-
nied, 465 U.S. 1034 (1984) (cases consolidated below but certiorari petitions
filed separately).
If this argument succeeds, prosecutors will not even have to satisfy all the
prerequisites to application of the co-conspirator doctrine. Under (D), there
would still be a timing requirement and the prosecutor would have to prove
that the content of the statement "concern[ed] a matter within the scope of
[the criminal agency] ... ." FED. R. EviD. 801(d)(2)(D). Subsection (D), how-
1986]
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B. THE INADMISSIBILITY OF GOVERNMENT AGENTS'
STATEMENTS OFFERED AS VICARIOUS ADMISSIONS
AGAINST THE PROSECUTING SOVEREIGN
In the words of Professor Irving Younger, a defendant
might initially assume that when "he confronted the sovereign
in court, the rules of the game would be the same for both. ' 62
The case law, however, does not bear out this assumption. In
civil actions, a growing body of authority holds that a party op-
posing the government may introduce a government employee's
statements as vicarious admissions of the government.63 Yet,
when the party invoking the vicarious admission doctrine is a
criminal defendant, the almost-uniform view is that the govern-
ment employee's statement is inadmissible hearsay. 64 The pros-
ecuting sovereign has "a blanket exemption" from the vicarious
admission doctrine.65
The seminal case granting the prosecution the exemption is
United States v. Santos.66 The United States charged Santos
with assaulting a federal officer. According to the prosecution's
theory of the case, Edward Dower, an agent of the Federal Bu-
reau of Narcotics, was present at the assault. At trial, Santos
attempted to introduce an exculpatory out-of-court affidavit by
Dower as a vicarious admission against the government.67 The
trial judge, however, sustained the prosecution's hearsay objec-
tion. Santos challenged the exclusion of the affidavit on appeal.
ever, does not require any proof of the declarant's purpose in making the
statement. In other words, if the courts applied (D), they would effectively
abolish the furtherance requirement. See also United States v. Martel, 792
F.2d 630, 635 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that a letter from an alleged co-conspira-
tor's employee was properly admitted at trial even though no determination
was made that the letter was a co-conspirator's statement as required by
United States v. Santiago, 582 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1978)).
62. Younger, supra note 17, at 108. Cf. Eastman v. United States, 212 F.2d
320, 322-23 (9th Cir. 1954) (citing civil cases as if they controlled the admissibil-
ity of a government agent's statement against the prosecution but finding that
the declarant's status as a government agent terminated before he made the
statement) (overruled on an unrelated issue by United States v. Demma, 523
F.2d 981, 982 (9th Cir. 1975)).
63. E.g., United States v. AT&T Co., 524 F. Supp. 1331, 1333-34 (D.D.C.
1981); Burkey v. Ellis, 483 F. Supp. 897, 911 n.13 (N.D. Ala. 1979).
64. McCORMICK, supra note 9, § 267, at 794-95. McCormick suggests that
the rule affords the government a measure of protection from errors and in-
discretions by its agents. Id.
65. Note, Vicarious Admissions by Agents of the Government: Defining
the Scope of Admissibility in Criminal Cases, 59 B.U.L. REv. 400, 400 (1979).
66. 372 F.2d 177 (2d Cir. 1967). Professor Irving Younger was the ap-
pointed defense counsel in Santos. See Younger, supra note 17, at 108.
67. See Santos, 372 F.2d at 179; Younger, supra note 17, at 111.
[Vol. 71:269
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The opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
in Santos became "the first appellate decision on the question
whether the admissions exception to the hearsay rule is avail-
able against the sovereign. s6 8 Citing the Gooding decision, the
court acknowledged that if the tables were turned, the prosecu-
tion could have resorted to the co-conspirator doctrine.6 9 Judge
Waterman, writing for the court, even conceded that there was
"seeming unfairness" in barring the defense evidence. 70 The
court nevertheless concluded that the evidence was inadmissi-
ble, reasoning that "[t]his apparent discrimination" is war-
ranted "by the peculiar posture of the parties in a criminal
prosecution. '71 The court observed that because the sovereign
represents all the people and seeks justice rather than simply
convictions, the prosecution is not an adversary litigant in the
normal sense. The sovereign's agents cannot "bind" the sover-
eign and, in criminal cases, the sovereign's law enforcement
agents are "supposedly uninterested personally" in the outcome
of the case.72
Although the Santos decision predates the Federal Rules of
Evidence, courts continue to adhere to its holding. In a line of
authority stretching through 1986, courts have espoused the
view that a government agent's statement cannot qualify as a
vicarious admission against the government in a prosecution.73
Even during the regime of the Federal Rules, courts affirm
"the continuing viability of the rule in Santos."74 According to
these courts, neither the text nor the legislative history of the
Federal Rules manifests a congressional intent to alter the San-
tos rule.75 Nor will courts permit the defense to circumvent the
rule by offering the government agent's statements under an
alternative hearsay exception. In 1977, for example, a district
court cited Santos to support its decision to reject an attempt by
the defense to introduce a government agent's statement under
68. Younger, supra note 17, at 112.
69. Santos, 372 F.2d at 180.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. E.g., United States v. Kapp, 781 F.2d 1008, 1014 (3d Cir. 1986), cert de-
nied, 106 S. Ct. 1220 (1986) ("There is no authority for the proposition that the
prosecution is a 'party' against whom such evidence can-be offered.").
74. See, e.g., United States v. Kampiles, 609 F.2d 1233, 1246 n.16 (7th Cir.
1979), cert denied, 446 U.S. 954 (1980).
75. See, e.g., id. at 1246 (text of the Federal Rules of Evidence); United
States v. Morgan, 581 F.2d 933, 938 & nn.14-15 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (legislative his-
tory of the Federal Rules of Evidence).
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the residual hearsay exception in Federal Rule of Evidence
803(24).76
The Santos result seems perverse when the reliability of
co-conspirators' and government agents' statements is com-
pared. The defendant may have little or no control over what
the co-conspirator says,77 and the co-conspirator may be an in-
corrigible liar. In contrast, the prosecuting sovereign has both
formal and practical control over its agents. The government
presumably chooses its agents at least in part on the basis of
their honesty and integrity. Yet, in the name of the hearsay
doctrine, which is designed to enhance reliable fact-finding, co-
conspirators' statements are routinely admitted while govern-
ment agents' statements are almost automatically barred. Com-
mon sense compels the conclusion that this result is "a
miscarriage of justice."78 The question is whether this result
runs afoul of the equal protection guarantee. 79
76. United States v. American Cyanamid Co., 427 F. Supp. 859, 867
(S.D.N.Y. 1977). For the text of the residual hearsay exception, see supra note
9.
77. See Oakley, supra note 30, at 15; Comment, supra note 34, at 539.
78. Younger, supra note 17, at 114.
79. Of course, the equal protection question would become moot if the
courts eliminated the differential treatment by another means such as statu-
tory construction. In other sections of the Rules, however, when Congress
wanted to confine a doctrine to a particular type of case, Congress expressly
indicated that intent. E.g., FED. R. EVID. 803(8)(C) (factual findings in official
records admissible against the government in criminal cases); FED. R. EviD.
804(b)(2) (statement made under belief of impending death concerning the
cause of death admissible in a prosecution for homocide or in a civil case).
As previously stated, however, subsections (C) and (D) of Rule 801(d)(2)
are not limited to civil actions by their terms. The language of Federal Rule of
Evidence 801(d)(2)(C)-(D) seems broad enough to allow a criminal defendant
to introduce against the government statements made by a government agent
within the scope of her employment. Several commentators have urged the
courts to apply Rule 801(d)(2)(C)-(D) to the statements of government agents
as they would to those of any other agent. E.g., Graham, Examination of a
Party's Own Witness Under the Federal Rules of Evidence: A Promise Unful-
filled, 54 TEX. L. Ray. 917, 993-94 (1976); Note, supra note 65, at 401. At least
one court seems sympathetic to the urging. United States v. Morgan, 581 F.2d
933, 937-38 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Bazelon, J.) (Once the government asserts the
trustworthiness of an informant's assertions, the government may not then ob-
ject to their admission on hearsay grounds.).
Although the above commentators and court find the text of Rule
801(d)(2)(C)-(D) expansive enough to permit the treatment of government
employees' statements as vicarious admissions in prosecutions, one court has
raised a counterargument also based on statutory construction. In United
States v. Kampiles, the Seventh Circuit noted that Rule 803(8) appears to con-
template the admission of government employees' reports against the govern-
ment in criminal cases under the official records hearsay exception. 609 F.2d
1233, 1246 n.16 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 954 (1980). The court rea-
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II. THE EXISTENCE OF A CLASSIFICATION
TRIGGERING THE APPLICATION OF THE
EQUAL PROTECTION GUARANTEE
Whenever the question arises whether differential treat-
ment violates the equal protection guarantee, the temptation is
to proceed immediately to the merits of the justifications ad-
vanced for the discrimination. Two issues, however, must be
soned that "this exception to the hearsay rule would be unnecessary if Rule
801(d)(2)(D) were found to encompass admissions by government employees."
Id.
The Seventh Circuit's counterargument, however, is unpersuasive. The
passage in Rule 803(8)(C) sanctions the admission of "factual findings" in offi-
cial records "against the Government in criminal cases." FED. R. EVID. 803(8).
Even if construed to apply to government employees' statements, Rule
801(d)(2)(C)-(D) would not render the language in Rule 803(8) surplusage.
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, many courts continue to demand proof
that the declarant of a vicarious admission had personal knowledge of the sub-
ject matter of the declaration. E.g., Union Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Chrysler Corp.,
793 F.2d 1, 8-9 (1st Cir. 1986). A sizeable body of authority, however, holds
that "factual findings" under Rule 803(8)(C) need not be based on personal
knowledge. See R. CARLSON, E. IMWINKELRIED & E. KIONKA, supra note 6, at
491. For example, the Sixth Circuit has admitted under Rule 803 a police re-
port containing a finding on the color of a traffic light at the time of an acci-
dent which the officer who had authored the report had not witnessed. Baker
v. Elcona Homes Corp., 588 F.2d 551, 556 (6th Cir. 1978), cert denied, 441 U.S.
933 (1979).
Thus, Rule 803(8)'s language would still have independent force and effect
because it would remain the only basis for admitting government employees'
statements that are not founded on personal knowledge. Further, assuming
that Rules 801(d)(2)(C)-(D) and 803(8) overlap, there would still be insuffi-
cient reason to interpret the former rule narrowly. The maxim of avoiding re-
dundant constructions is merely a guide to legislative interpretation, not a
positive rule of law. 2A C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
§ 46.06 (4th ed. 1984). Congress was not overly concerned with redundancy in
drafting the Federal Rules of Evidence and many sections are essentially re-
petitive. See FED. R. EVID. 104(b), 602 & 1008; 1 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER,
FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 26, at 155-56 (1977); Imwinkelried, Judge Versus Jury:
Who Should Decide Questions of Preliminary Facts Conditioning the Admis-
sibility of Scientific Evidence9 25 WiM. & MARY L. REV. 577, 611 (1984).
If courts eventually reject the Seventh Circuit's counterargument in
Kampiles and accept the broader construction of Rule 801(d)(2)(C)-(D), the
equal protection issue will be moot. Some jurisdictions, however, lack statutes
as liberalizing as Rule 801(d)(2)(D). California is a case in point. Under Cali-
fornia law, the statement must be made "by a person authorized by the party
to make a statement or statements for him concerning the subject matter of
the statement." CAL. EVID. CODE § 1222(a) (West 1966). This language seem-
ingly codifies the traditional common law test that the declarant must be a di-
rect spokesperson for the party. See Note, supra note 65, at 404-05. The
existence of a statute incorporating the traditional restrictive test in the juris-
diction obviously would make it more difficult to remedy the differential treat-
ment of co-conspirators' and government agents' statements through statutory
construction.
1986]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
resolved before reaching the merits. One issue is the level of
judicial scrutiny to which the classification should be subject.
Even before identifying the appropriate tier of scrutiny, how-
ever, the court must resolve the threshold issue, namely,
whether a classification exists to trigger application of the equal
protection doctrine. Although often overlooked, this question
can be "the jugular vein" of an equal protection argument.8 0
The starting point in determining the applicability of the
fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause is its language:
"No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.""' The language of the clause
presents four potential obstacles to applying the equal protec-
tion guarantee to the differential treatment of co-conspirators'
and government agents' statements. First, the clause expressly
applies only to a "State." Invocation of the clause to attack the
constitutionality of a Federal Rule of Evidence enacted by the
national Congress might therefore be precluded. The Supreme
Court removed this potential obstacle, however, when it held
that the fifth amendment's due process clause contains an equal
protection component.8 2 As a general rule, any classification vi-
olative of the fourteenth amendment will also run afoul of the
fifth amendment's equal protection component.83
80. See M. FoRKoscH, CONsTITUrIoNAL LAw § 444, at 519 (2d ed. 1969).
81. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
82. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) ("The concepts of equal pro-
tection and due process .. .are not mutually exclusive."). The lower courts
repeatedly state that the equal protection guarantees of the fifth and four-
teenth amendments are the same or identical. E.g., United States v. Craven,
478 F.2d 1329, 1338 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973). The Supreme
Court itself has stated that the "[e]qual protection analysis in the Fifth
Amendment area is the same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment."
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976). See also Marozsan v. United States, 635
F. Supp. 578, 580 (N.D. Ind. 1986) (Although couched in due process terms, the
fifth amendment includes the concept of equal protection.).
83. See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975) (The "ap-
proach to Fifth Amendment equal protection claims has always been precisely
the same as to equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment.");
Young v. Pierce, 544 F. Supp. 1010, 1019 (E.D. Tex. 1982). See generally Karst,
The Fifth Amendment's Guarantee of Equal Protection, 55 N.C. L. REV. 451
(1977).
This general rule does have certain exceptions. Once a classification trig-
gers the equal protection doctrine, the question becomes whether the govern-
ment making the classification has a satisfactory justification for its action.
See infra text accompanying notes 119-62. In particular, when the classifica-
tion affects foreign policy or a subject within the national government's pecu-
liar province, such as immigration, the national government may be able to
advance justifications that a state government cannot. See, e.g., De Malherbe
v. International Union of Elevator Constructors, 476 F. Supp. 649, 665 (N.D.
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Second, the clause restricts its guarantee to one of equal
treatment under "the laws." This restriction does not foreclose
the clause's applicability to the Federal Rules of Evidence be-
cause "laws" within the meaning of the clause clearly extends
to legislative enactments.8 4 Yet, a state may adopt the Santos
rule by judicial decision rather than by legislative enactment.
The question therefore arises whether judicial classifications
are amenable to equal protection challenge. Just as the due
process clause has been interpreted to cover judicial action,8 5
however, the equal protection doctrine applies to diverse forms
of state action,8 6 including actions by the courts.8 7 Thus, the
Cal. 1979) ("Although the federal government may sometimes establish that
overriding national interests justify a rule excluding aliens, even where a state
could not have validly adopted such a rule, defendants have not made such a
showing in this case."). When a uniquely national interest comes into play, the
equal protection guaranteed by the fifth amendment may not be coextensive
with the protection afforded under the fourteenth amendment. See id.; Note,
Constitutional Law: The Equal Protection Clause: The Effect of Plyler v. Doe
on Intermediate Scrutiny, 36 OKLA. L. REv. 321, 328 (1983). None of those pe-
culiarly national interests, however, seems applicable to the evidentiary treat-
ment of co-conspirators' and government agents' statements.
84. It is well settled that the equal protection clause applies to classifica-
tions made by the legislatures in statutes. See Tussman and tenBroek, supra
note 23, at 356. The Federal Rules of Evidence are a statute enacted by Con-
gress. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. 93-595, § 1, 88 Stat. 1926. Rule 801(d)(2)(E)
codifies the co-conspirator doctrine, and some federal courts have read the
Santos rule into Rules 801(d)(2)(C)-(D) as well. See United States v. Kapp, 781
F.2d 1008, 1014 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1220 (1986). So construed, the
Federal Rules themselves classify government agents' statements differently
than co-conspirators' statements. In any jurisdiction adopting this interpreta-
tion of the Rules, there is a statutory classification amenable to equal protec-
tion analysis.
85. See J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, supra note 24, at 497. Some
constitutional prohibitions apply only to statutes enacted by legislatures. For
example, the bill of attainder and ex post facto prohibitions apply only to legis-
lation. See Korte v. Office of Personnel Mgmt., 797 F.2d 967, 972 (Fed. Cir.
1986) (bill of attainder); United States v. Stone, 546 F. Supp. 234, 238 (S.D. Tex.
1982) (ex post facto). Courts have applied the due process clause to myriad
forms of state action, however, whether the action is taken by "a legislature,
executive officer, or a court." J. NOWIAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, supra
note 24, at 497.
86. Both the due process and equal protection clauses are part of the four-
teenth amendment. Because the clauses are parts of the same amendment
adopted at the same time, they are in parl materia. See 2A C. SANDS, STAT-
UTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 51.03 (4th ed. 1984). The due process
clause, therefore, constitutes part of the context for interpreting the equal pro-
tection clause. See id. Like the due process clause, the equal protection clause
functions as a restraint on the action of every governmental agency and instru-
mentality. See Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 479-80 (1968) (govern-
ment agency); Raymond v. Chicago Union Traction Co., 207 U.S. 20 (1907)
(instrumentality). Even if legislation is fair as written, its application or exe-
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differential evidentiary treatment should be subject to equal
protection attack whether it is created by statute or by case
law.
The final two restrictions contained in the clause's lan-
guage are more difficult to overcome. The clause guarantees
equal protection only to a "person." Rigorous analysis must
therefore address the questions whether the clause applies only
to classifications of persons rather than classifications of things
and, if so, whether the differential treatment of two kinds of
statements amounts to a classification of persons. Finally, the
clause assures all persons "equal" protection. This raises the
question whether the clause contemplates equality of treatment
between a private citizen and the government itself, rather
than simply equal governmental treatment of private citizens.
A negative answer to any of these questions would preclude
finding a classification and foreclose an equal protection attack
on the differential treatment of co-conspirators' and govern-
ment agents' statements.
A. THE APPLICABILITY OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION DOCTRINE
TO CLASSIFICATIONS OF EVIDENCE
The equal protection clause guarantees evenhanded treat-
ment of persons, not things. In McGowan v. Maryland,8 8 the
cution may violate the doctrine. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975);
Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1944); Concordia Fire Ins. Co. v. Illinois, 292
U.S. 535 (1938); Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield, 247 U.S. 350 (1918); United
States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1973); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.
YOUNG, supra note 24, at 519, 527; L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW
§ 16-17 (1978).
87. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 179 (1972) (stating that
"state action" may emanate from judicial action); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1,
17 (1958) (stating that the constitutional right not to be discriminated against
cannot be nullified by judicial officers); State v. Plenty Horse, 85 S.D. 401, 184
N.W.2d 654, 656 (1971) (stating it is immaterial whether discrimination is
caused by the legislature or the courts); Washington State Commercial Passen-
ger Fishing Vessel Ass'n v. Tollefson, 89 Wash. 2d 276, 285, 571 P.2d 1373, 1378
(1977) (stating that equal protection must apply to all courts, otherwise the ju-
dicial branch would be empowered to amend the Constitution), vacated on
other grounds, 443 U.S. 658 (1979).
Judicial actions held subject to the equal protection doctrine have in-
cluded the selection of jurors, the awarding of damages and the granting of a
divorce decree. See Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986) (juror selec-
tion); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953) (damages award); Beazley v.
David, 92 Nev. 81, 545 P.2d 206 (1976) (divorce decree). These precedents com-
pel the conclusion that differentiating between government agents' and co-
conspirators' statements is subject to equal protection scrutiny.
88. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
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Supreme Court confronted a multifaceted attack on the Mary-
land Sunday Closing Law. The appellants attacked the law, in
part, on the ground that it denied them equal protection. The
law generally prohibited sales on Sunday in Maryland but ex-
cepted certain types of retailers in Anne Arundel County. The
Court held that although the exception resulted in differential
treatment of retailers in different counties, the difference did
not create a classification triggering the equal protection
clause.8 9 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Warren stated
that "the Equal Protection Clause relates to equality between
persons as such, rather than between areas and that territorial
uniformity is not a constitutional prerequisite."90
If the doctrine relates only to equality between persons as
such, the doctrine arguably cannot apply to evidentiary classifi-
cations. By their terms, most evidentiary classifications draw
dividing lines between things rather than persons. For exam-
ple, in most of the hearsay exceptions under Federal Rules of
Evidence 803 and 804, the foundational requirements for each
exception remain the same regardless of the identity of the pro-
ponent of the evidence. Whether the proponent is a civil plain-
tiff, civil defendant, prosecutor or criminal defendant, the
foundational requirements for present sense impressions are
constant.91
Nevertheless, the premise that the doctrine relates to
equality between persons does not necessarily lead to the con-
clusion that all evidentiary classifications are invulnerable to
equal protection attack. Suppose, for example, that an eviden-
tiary rule bans a particular type of evidence and that a civil de-
fendant can demonstrate that it is almost always the defense
that proffers that type of evidence. The civil defendant can
then analogize to the equal protection precedents holding that
89. Id. at 427.
90. Id. See also Reeder v. Kansas City Bd. of Police Comm'rs, 796 F.2d
1050, 1053-55 (8th Cir. 1986) (upholding as not violative of the equal protection
doctrine a Missouri statute prohibiting Kansas City police officers from partici-
pating in or contributing to political causes and campaigns because it regulated
all persons similarly situated within the regulated territory equally; although
the territory was treated differently from other areas, the equal protection
doctrine relates to persons not places) (citing McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420, 427 (1961)); Templeton v. Metropolitan Gov't of Nashville and Davidson
County, 650 S.W.2d 743, 753-54 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983) (upholding a law restrict-
ing retail package liquor sales to "urban services districts" because the equal
protection doctrine relates to equality between persons and not places) (citing
McGowan, 366 U.S. at 427.).
91. See FED. R. EVID. 803(1).
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the disproportionate impact of a facially neutral law on one
class of persons effected a classification.92
More important for purposes of this inquiry, courts ought
to treat a rule governing the admissibility of evidence as a clas-
sification when the rule conditions the admissibility of the evi-
dence, at least in part, on the proponent's identity. In this
situation, a classification of persons is an integral part of the ev-
identiary classification. The Santos93 case made precisely such
a classification. First, the court conceded that the prosecution
may avail itself of the vicarious admission doctrine against the
defendant.94 Then, in its next breath, the court announced that
defendants may not invoke that doctrine against the prosecu-
tion.9 5 Thus, under the Santos rule, the admissibility of evi-
dence turns, in part, on the identity of the evidence's
proponent. At least in this limited situation, an evidentiary
rule is a classification of persons.
B. THE APPLICABILITY OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION DOCTRINE
TO CLASSIFICATIONS DRAWN BETWEEN PRIVATE AND
GOVERNMENT AGENTS
The initial three hurdles to finding a classification trigger-
ing the equal protection clause are relatively easy to overcome
because of the wealth of precedent on each of those issues. The
last hurdle, however, is the most difficult to surmount because
relatively little case law analyzes the validity of classifications
drawn between private citizens and government agents.
In the typical case involving equal protection analysis, the
court analyzes a line drawn between two classes of private citi-
zens.96 In contrast, when a private party challenges state action
92. See Blattner, The Supreme Court's "Intermediate" Equal Protection
Decisions: Five Imperfect Models of Constitutional Equality, 8 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 777, 786 (1981) (pointing out that "in two landmark cases, the
Supreme Court held that it would not apply strict scrutiny to government ac-
tions having a disparate impact on members of different races unless the ac-
tions were based on an overt or covert racial classification, or unless the
government decisionmaker actually intended to disadvantage a racial group"
(citing Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 265 (1977) and Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976))). See gener-
ally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 24, at 600-11 (discussing
classifications that discriminate on their face, in their application or in their
purpose and effect).
93. United States v. Santos, 372 F.2d 177 (2d Cir. 1967). See supra text ac-
companying notes 66-72.
94. Santos, 372 F.2d at 180.
95. Id.
96. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 24, at 423 (noting
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on due process grounds, the antagonists usually are the private
party on one side and the government agents on the other.
9 7
The Supreme Court itself has declared that:
'Due Process" emphasizes fairness between the State and the individ-
ual dealing with the State, regardless of how other individuals in the
same situation may be treated. "Equal protection," on the other hand,
emphasizes disparity in treatment by a State between classes of indi-
viduals whose situations are arguably indistinguishable.
98
This language suggests that the mission of the due process
clause is to control the government's relations with private citi-
zens, while the province of the equal protection clause is to reg-
ulate government classifications between and among private
citizens.99 Seizing on this language, a prosecutor defending the
Santos rule might contend that the only proper challenge to the
rule is a substantive due process attack. The prosecutor might
argue that the equal protection clause does not regulate the va-
lidity of lines drawn between private citizens and the state.
Principle and precedent, however, mandate rejection of
this argument; it reflects a simplistic conception of the relation-
ship between the due process and equal protection clauses be-
cause it assumes that the clauses have mutually exclusive
domains. Such an assumption flies in the face of well-settled
law that the due process clause of the fifth amendment in-
cludes an equal protection component. 00 More important, the
assumption is at odds with both the purpose of the equal pro-
tection clause and the overall philosophy of the Constitution.
The purpose of the equal protection clause is to prevent govern-
ment favoritism, 0 1 whether that favoritism is based on race,
creed, status or rank.0 2 The clause was inspired by the same
that courts will strictly scrutinize legislation that classifies or separates out
certain individuals or groups for specific government benefits or punishments);
L. TRIBE, supra note 86, § 16-1, at 993-94 (constitutional norm can be violated
by either government classification of persons or government failure to
classify).
97. See J. NowAx, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 24, at 416 (Due
process involves a determination of "whether or not a government entity has
taken an individual's life, liberty, or property. .. ."); see generally id at 423
(contrasting due process and equal protection analysis); L. TRIBE, supra note
86, § 10-7 (discussing due process limitations on governmental actions towards
individuals).
98. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 609 (1974).
99. See, e.g., In re Valenti, 178 Cal. App. 3d 470, 224 Cal. Rtpr. 10, 12 (1986)
(equal protection analysis applied to test sentence-reduction distinction be-
tween felons and misdemeanants).
100. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
101. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 23, at 358, 365.
102. Id. at 342.
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egalitarian instinct underlying the constitutional prohibition
against granting titles of nobility.103 It surely would effectuate
the anti-favoritist purpose of the equal protection doctrine to
apply the clause to classifications favoring government agents
over private citizens.
If extending the equal protection clause to classifications
between private citizens and government agents is consistent
with the clause's purpose, the extension also seems required by
the overall philosophy of the Constitution. The Founding Fa-
thers fashioned a constitutional model designed to contain and
restrain government power. 04 That model identifies liberty
with the absence of government. 05 It would frustrate the phi-
losophy underlying that model to exempt classifications favor-
ing government agents from equal protection scrutiny. Given
the nation's traditional anti-statist bias, the most suspect sort of
classification-the one sort of classification that should not es-
cape equal protection scrutiny-is one that prefers the govern-
ment over private citizens.
Available precedent points toward the same conclusion.
Courts have applied the equal protection doctrine to classifica-
tions among government officials, 06 government employees,107
and applicants for government employment. 0 8 Other courts
103. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8; see Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 23, at342, 352 (discussing the incorporation of the doctrine of equality into the four-
teenth amendment).
104. See L. TRIBE, supra note 86, § 1-2 (discussing early restrictions on gov-
ernment power).
105. See Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 23, at 380.
106. See, e.g., Chandler v. Louisville, 277 Ky. 79, 125 S.W.2d 1026 (1939).
107. See, e.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973) (state employees);
Johnson v. Mayor of Baltimore, 731 F.2d 209 (4th Cir. 1984) (fire fighters),
rev'd on other grounds, 105 S. Ct. 2717 (1985); Avery v. Homewood City Bd. of
Educ., 674 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1982) (teachers), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 943 (1983);
Martin v. Tamaki, 607 F.2d 307 (9th Cir. 1979) (city water and power depart-
ment employees); Gault v. Garrison, 569 F.2d 993 (7th Cir. 1977) (teachers),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 945 (1979); Hutchinson v. Lake Oswego School Dist., 519
F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1975) (teachers), vacated on other grounds, 429 U.S. 1033(pursuant to Lake Oswego's petition), cert denied, 429 U.S. 1037 (1977)(Hutchinson's petition); Green v. Waterford Bd. of Educ., 473 F.2d 629 (2d Cir.
1973) (teachers); Lynn v. Kootenai County Fire Protective Dist. #1, 97 Idaho
623, 550 P.2d 126 (1976) (fire fighters); Minneapolis Fed'n of Teachers Local 59
v. Obermeyer, 275 Minn. 347, 147 N.W.2d 358 (1966) (teachers).
108. See, e.g., Personnel Adm'r of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256(1979) (state civil service applicants); New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer,
440 U.S. 568 (1979) (transit authority applicants); State v. Wylie, 516 P.2d 142(Alaska 1973) (state civil service applicants), modified on other grounds, Wil-
liams v. Zobel, 619 P.2d 422, 431 (Alaska 1980); Ridaught v. Division of Florida
Hwy. Patrol, 314 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 1975) (state highway patrol applicants).
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have applied the doctrine when government employees 0 9 and
officials ° challenged statutes that imposed on them burdens
that did not apply to private citizens. These two categories of
cases supply analogical support for the application of the doc-
trine to classifications conferring unique benefits on the gov-
ernment and its agents.
At least one court, moreover, has provided direct support
for the proposition that a government's grant of unique benefits
to itself may be challenged on equal protection grounds. In
Nelson v. State Department of Natural Resources,1 1' the Minne-
sota Supreme Court assessed the constitutionality of a state
statute that provided special protection to the state government
as an employer. Under the statute, if a tort victim was a state
employee and the tortfeasor wanted to settle with the em-
ployee, the tortfeasor was required to give the state notice of
the settlement. The purpose of the statute was to protect the
state's subrogation claim under the workers' compensation stat-
ute. The statute required notice of settlement only if the vic-
tim's employer was the state; private employers were not
entitled to notice. The court pointed out that the statute "dis-
tinguishes the state as an employer from all other employers
and accords its interests greater protection."" 2 In invalidating
the statute on equal protection grounds, the court noted that
"no genuine or substantial distinctions between the state as an
employer" and private employers warranted giving greater pro-
tection to the state's rights than that accorded to private
employers.'1 3
109. See, e.g., Local 2106, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, AFL-CIO v. City of
Rock Hill, 660 F.2d 97 (4th Cir. 1981) (fire fighters prevented from discussing
employment matters before city council); AFSCME Councils 6, 14, 65 & 96 v.
Sundquist, 338 N.W.2d 560 (Minn. 1983) (public employees contested a pension
contribution increase meant to offset a decrease in employers' tax), appeal dis-
missed, 466 U.S. 933 (1984).
110. See, e.g., Morial v. Judiciary Comm'n of Louisiana, 565 F.2d 295 (5th
Cir. 1977) (challenging the Code of Judicial Ethics requirement that judges re-
sign when filing candidacy for nonjudicial office), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1013
(1978).
111. 305 N.W.2d 317 (Minn. 1981).
112. Id. at 319.
113. Id. at 319-20. A fair amount of litigation has involved special notice re-
quirements for claims against government agencies. These requirements typi-
cally prescribe notice periods shorter than the normal statute of limitations
applicable to claims against private persons. See, e.g., James v. Southeastern
Pa. Trans. Auth. (SEPTA), 505 Pa. 137, 140-42, 477 A.2d 1302, 1303-04 (1984)
(six month statute of limitations for claims against transportation authority
held not violative of equal protection); Case Note, Application of Intermediate
Scrutiny Standard Hinges on "Importance" of Rights Affected, Pennsylvania
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Recognizing that the Minnesota Supreme Court engaged in
a two-part analysis is crucial to the present inquiry. Although
not specifically enunciated, the court first correctly perceived
that a classification conferring peculiar benefits on the govern-
ment is subject to equal protection scrutiny. The validity of thejustifications advanced for the differential treatment was an en-
tirely distinct question. Similarly, the differential treatment of
co-conspirators' and government agents' statements is a classifi-
cation falling within the purview of the equal protection doc-
trine. Whether genuine distinctions between the government
and private defendants justify the differential treatment is a
separate inquiry.
III. IDENTIFYING THE APPROPRIATE TIER OF EQUAL
PROTECTION SCRUTINY
Finding a classification is only the beginning of equal pro-
tection analysis. Most government classifications are valid.
American citizens have a wide range of abilities and needs. The
government must be able to draw some lines between and
among its citizens.114 Courts generally acknowledge the gov-
ernment's power to classify 15 and distinguish. 16 Although the
Supreme Court Review, 1984, 58 TEMP. L.Q. 347, 352 n.45 (1985) (stating in this
critique of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's application of intermediate level
scrutiny in James v. SEPTA, that Pennsylvania joined the majority of jurisdic-
tions upholding similar notice requirements and listing cases from jurisdictions
on both sides of the issue). Although the courts are split over the validity of
these requirements under the equal protection clause, they uniformly treat the
requirements as classifications for equal protection purposes and reach the
merits of the justification for treating the government differently than private
defendants. See also McAllister v. South Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 183
Cal. App. 3d 653, 228 Cal. Rptr. 351, 355 (1986) (applying equal protection anal-
ysis to classification denying punitive damages in an action against a govern-
mental tortfeasor).
114. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652 (1972) (citing Glona v. Ameri-
can Guar. & Liability Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 75-6 (1968)) (stating that the equal
protection doctrine only restricts line drawing;, it does not forbid it); Barcume
v. City of Flint, 638 F. Supp. 1230, 1235 n.17 (E.D. Mich. 1986) ("A legislature
must have substantial latitude to establish classifications that roughly approxi-
mate the nature of the problem perceived, that accommodate competing con-
cerns both public and private and that account for limitations on the practical
ability of the state to remedy every ill.").
115. E.g., New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) ("Unless a classifi-
cation trammels fundamental personal rights or is drawn upon inherently sus-
pect distinctions such as race .... our decisions presume the constitutionality
of the statutory discriminations and require only that the classification chal-
lenged be rationally related to a legitimate state interest.").
116. See, e.g., Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 484 (1968) (In re-jecting the county's unequal districting for the purpose of electing commission-
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government's power to draw lines has some limits, 17 the
Supreme Court has even refrained from holding that bases of
classifications such as race are always forbidden and repugnant
to equal protection.118 Having found a classification, the next
question is what level of scrutiny the court will apply to it.
This section surveys the state of the jurisprudence on tiers of
scrutiny and attempts to identify the proper tier for analyzing
the validity of the differential treatment of co-conspirators' and
government agents' statements.
A. THE THREE TIERS OF EQUAL PROTECTION SCRUTINY
Judicial scrutiny of government actions challenged on
equal protection grounds falls into three categories: minimal,
strict and intermediate.
Minimal scrutiny is the most relaxed.11 9 It requires only
that the governmental classification have some rational rela-
tionship to a legitimate state policy. It does not demand a per-
fect fit, 20 abstract symmetry'2 1 or mathematical nicety.122 The
test is satisfied as long as there is a rough accommodation be-
tween the classification as a means and a legitimate state
end.123 The test reflects an extraordinary degree of deference
to the judgment of the government official making the classifi-
cation.2 4 In some cases, courts declare that they will uphold
the classification so long as the government official could rea-
sonably conceive' 25 or hypothesize2s facts creating a nexus or
relationship. Courts normally apply the minimal scrutiny
ers with power to set tax rates, among other things, the Court stated that
equal protection "does not, of course, require that the state never distinguish
between citizens .... ).
117. See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 652 (citing Glona, 391 U.S. at 75-76).
118. See Tussman & tenBroaek, supra note 23, at 353-56.
119. Crane v. Schneider, 635 F. Supp. 1430, 1432 (E.D.N.Y, 1986); L. TRIBE,
supra note 86, § 16-2.
120. Unity Ventures v. County of Lake, 631 F. Supp. 181, 202 (N.D. Ill.
1986).
121. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex reL Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 540 (1942) (cit-
ing Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138, 144 (1914)).
122. United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 538 (1973) (cit-
ing Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970)).
123. L. TRIBE, supra note 86, § 16-4, at 997.
124. Dieffenbach v. Attorney Gen. of Vermont, 604 F.2d 187, 195 (2d Cir.
1979).
125. Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 485 (citing McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,
426 (1961)); Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 528 (1959); Jackson
Water Works v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 793 F.2d 1090, 1094 (9th Cir. 1986);
Riverside Steel Constr. Co. v. William H. Simpson Constr. Co., 181 Cal. App.
3d 411, 227 Cal. Rptr. 424, 429 (1985).
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test,127 especially when the classification appears in economic
or social welfare legislation. 2 8 When courts apply this low
level of scrutiny, they in effect presume the constitutionality of
the classification. 2 9 If the classification has any arguable ra-
tional basis, courts will sustain the statute even if they are con-
vinced that the classification is improvident or unwise.130
Professor Gerald Gunther has written that minimal scrutiny is
"toothless"-it has no bite.13 1
At the polar extreme is so-called strict scrutiny.132 When
courts apply this test, they require the government to show
that the classification is a necessary means related to a compel-
ling or overriding state interest.133 This test imposes a heavy
126. Bunyan v. Camacho, 770 F.2d 773, 774 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106
S. Ct. 3271 (1986).
127. See, e.g., Diebler v. City of Rehoboth Beach, 790 F.2d 328, 333-34 (3d
Cir. 1986) (In considering a candidacy restriction, the court began with the
minimum rational basis test and considered reasons to heighten their scru-
tiny.); McLain v. Meier, 496 F. Supp. 462, 465-66 (D.N.D. 1980) (Courts "gener-
ally adhere to the rule that a state does not act unlawfully if the classification
is rationally related to a legitimate government objective."); Branch v. DuBois,
418 F. Supp. 1128, 1130 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (noting that veterans preference chal-
lenges are routinely subjected to the minimum rational basis standard).
128. See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8 (1974); Graham
v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371 (1971); Gronne v. Abrams, 793 F.2d 74, 77 (2d
Cir. 1986); Jackson Water Works, 793 F.2d at 1093-94; Harlan v. Frazier, 635 F.
Supp. 718, 724 (W.D. La. 1986); Case v. United States Dep't of Agric., 642 F.
Supp. 341, 347 (M.D. Pa. 1986).
129. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 17 (1979) (citing New Orleans v.
Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976)); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979); see
also Illinois Psychological Ass'n v. Falk, 638 F. Supp. 876, 881 (N.D. Ill. 1986)
(plaintiff forced to assume the "heavy burden" of establishing that the state
action was not rationally related to a legitimate state purpose).
130. Vance, 440 U.S. at 97; cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 527
(Stewart, J., dissenting) (In arguing that a state law should be upheld, Justice
Stewart stated, "I think this is an uncommonly silly law .... But we are not
asked in this case to say whether we think this law is unwise, or even asinine.
We are asked to hold that it violates the United States Constitution. And that
I cannot do.").
131. Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court. A Model for a Newer Equal Protec-
tion, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 18-19 (1972).
132. E.g., Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 295-96 (1978) (rejecting the "high
hurdle of 'strict scrutiny' "). This level of scrutiny has also been termed
"close" or "heightened," see Graham, 403 U.S. at 372, and "exacting," see
Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969). See generally J.
NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 24, at 591-92 (discussing strict
scrutiny).
133. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 n.7 (1982) (stating in
dicta that for a classification to permissibly impinge upon a fundamental free-
dom it must be "necessary to the achievement of a compelling state interest").
See generally J. NowAx, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 24, at 591-92.
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burden of justification on the government. 34 It is almost im-
possible for the government to meet this burden and, in the
vast majority of cases, a court's decision to apply strict scrutiny
is fatal to the classification.135
Courts reserve strict scrutiny for exceptional fact situations
that fall into two categories. In one category, the basis for the
classification is suspect. 36 Such classifications operate against
classes of persons who have been subjected to a long history of
purposeful unequal treatment, or who have been relegated to
such a politically powerless position that they need extraordi-
nary protection from the majority.137 Race is the premier ex-
ample of a suspect basis of classification. 138
In the second category, the classification "trammels"'139 or
"impinges upon"'140 a fundamental right.14 The line drawn in
these cases has an "appreciable,"''1 "adverse"' 43 effect on a
right explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution. 44
134. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972).
135. See L. TRIBE, supra note 86, § 16-6, at 1000 (citing Gunther, supra note
131, at 8).
136. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971) (Classifications
based on alienage, nationality or race are suspect and are thus subject to close
judicial scrutiny.). For discussions of the suspect classification doctrine, see
generally Antieau, The Jurisprudence of Interests and Adjudication of Equal
Protection Controversies, 57 U. DET. J. URB. L. 831, 836-37 (1980); Note, Alter-
native Model of Equal Protection Analysis: Plyler v. Doe 24 B.C.L. REv. 1363,
1373 (1983).
137. See Doe v. Plyler, 628 F.2d 448, 558 (5th Cir. 1980) (citing San Antonio
Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)), aff'd, 457 U.S. 202
(1982).
138. E.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) ("Classifications based
solely upon race must be scrutinized with particular care .... "); Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) ("[A]ll legal restrictions which curtail
the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect .... [Courts
must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.").
139. E.g., Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 17 (1979) ("trammels") (citing
New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976)).
140. E.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist, 411 U.S. at 17 ("impinges").
141. E.g., McLain v. Meier, 496 F. Supp. 462, 466 (D.N.D.), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part on other grounds, 637 F.2d 1159 (8th Cir. 1980). For discussion of
the fundamental rights classification, see generally Antieau, supra note 136, at
839-41; Note, supra note 136, at 1371.
142. McLain, 496 F. Supp. at 462; cf. Serrano v. Priest, 180 Cal. App. 3d
1187, 226 Cal. Rtpr. 584, 606 (1986) (requiring plaintiffs to show their right to
education had been substantially impaired).
143. Gilday v. Board of Elections, 472 F.2d 214, 217 (6th Cir. 1972).
144. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist, 411 U.S. at 33; Kovach v. Mid-
dendorf, 424 F. Supp. 72, 78 (D. Del. 1976); Cieliczka v. Johnson, 363 F. Supp.
453, 457 (E.D. Mich. 1973). See generally Comment, Equal Protection of the
Laws: Education Is Not A Fundamental Right 26 U. FLA. L. REV. 155, 157-59
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The question is not the social importance of the individual's in-
terest 145 but, rather, whether the Constitution itself establishes
the right.146 Courts have treated the rights to vote, 47 to pro-
create, 48 to travel interstate 49 and to exercise first amendment
liberties 50 as fundamental interests.
The principal remaining dispute over strict scrutiny is the
extent to which a right must be "textually footed" in the Con-
stitution to qualify as a fundamental interest.151 For example,
in a recent equal protection decision, the Supreme Court strug-
gled over the question whether the right of interstate migration
is sufficiently textually footed. 52 Justice Brennan's plurality
opinion held the right to be fundamental, although Brennan
conceded that he could find "no citable passage in the Constitu-
tion to assign as its source.' 53 In dissent, Justice O'Connor
agreed to the characterization of the right as fundamental but
felt compelled to trace the right to a more explicit constitu-
(1973) (discussing San Antonio Indep. School Dist requirement that the right
to be protected be founded in the text of the Constitution).
145. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist, 411 U.S. at 33 (The societal im-
portance of education is not sufficient to establish education as a fundamental
right.); Chatham v. Jackson, 613 F.2d 73, 80 (5th Cir. 1980) (Although impor-
tant to society and individuals, access to water service, like housing and wel-
fare benefits, is not a right requiring closest constitutional scrutiny.). The
approach here contrasts with the Supreme Court's approach in deciding
whether to apply the middle level of scrutiny. The Court in those cases does
consider the social importance of the affected interest. See infra text accom-
panying notes 195-203.
146. San Antonio Indep. School Dist, 411 U.S. at 33; Frazier v. Manson, 176
Conn. 638, 646, 410 A.2d 475, 480 (1979).
147. See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30-31 (1968); Harper v. Vir-
ginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966); Reeder v. Kansas City Bd. of
Police Comm'rs, 796 F.2d 1050, 1054 (8th Cir. 1986); Vargas v. Calabrese, 634 F.
Supp. 910, 927-28 (D.N.J. 1986).
148. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma ez rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541
(1942).
149. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-30 (1969).
150. See, e.g., Vargas, 634 F. Supp. at 927-28 (political association and voting
are fundamental rights); Clark v. State, 665 S.W.2d 476, 480 n.3 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1984) (rights guaranteed by the first amendment are fundamental).
151. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Texas Motor Vehicles Comm'n, 755 F.2d
1192, 1202 (5th Cir. 1985) (refusing to make the right to certain judicial proce-
dures fundamental because they are not supported "by relevant constitutional
text, history, and structural inference").
152. Attorney Gen. of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 106 S. Ct. 2317, 2320-21,
2330 (1986) (Justices Brennan's and O'Connor's contrasting viewpoints over
textual footing).
153. Id. at 2320 n.2 (quoting Zohel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 67 (1982) (Bren-
nan, J., concurring)).
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tional source, namely, the privileges and immunities clause.lM4
Although the definition of a fundamental right still gives
the Supreme Court some difficulty, the most noteworthy recent
development in equal protection jurisprudence has been the
emergence of a third level of scrutiny, the intermediate or mid-
dle tier.155 Until recently, most of the Justices subscribed to a
two-tiered model of equal protection analysis. 56 The third, or
intermediate, tier initially arose in cases involving governmen-
tal sex discrimination,157 and many of the cases applying the
new tier have invalidated gender classifications.' 58
The intermediate tier requires the government to demon-
strate that the classification is substantially related to an im-
portant state interest. 5 9 The first prong of this intermediate
test addresses the magnitude of the government interest. The
end or government interest at stake must be exceedingly per-
suasive.160 Ordinarily, neither administrative convenience nor
economic savings is a sufficiently important interest.16 ' The
second prong takes an intensified look at the asserted means-
end relationship; there must be a close fit between the end (the
154. Id. at 2330 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
155. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (intermediate level of scrutiny
appropriate for gender discrimination case). See also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202, 216-18 (1982) (education); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (illegiti-
macy). For a discussion of this newer level of scrutiny in equal protection
analysis, see generally J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 24, at
592-93; Note, supra note 136, at 1384-85, 1389; Comment, Plyler v. Doe: The
Quasi Fundamental Right Emerges in Equal Protection Analysis, 19 NEW ENG.
L. REV. 151, 169 (1983).
156. See Fox, Equal Protection Analysis: Laurence Tribe, The Middle Tier,
and the Role of the Cour 14 U.S.F. L. REV. 525-26, 569 (1980).
157. See, e.g., Craig, 429 U.S. 190; Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
158. See, e.g., Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 147-52 (1980)
(holding unconstitutional Missouri's workers' compensation law because it de-
nied a widower benefits after his wife's work-related death, unless he was
mentally or physically incapacitated or proved dependence, but did not impose
similar requirements on a widow to qualify for death benefits); Orr v. Orr, 440
U.S. 268, 278-83 (1979) (Alabama statute under which husbands, but not wives,
could be required to pay alimony held unconstitutional); Marshall v. Kirkland,
602 F.2d 1282, 1298-1301 (8th Cir. 1979) (school district practice of hiring only
men or women for specific administrative jobs established a prima facie case of
gender discrimination).
159. E.g., Craig, 429 U.S. at 197; Ridgeway v. Montana High School Ass'n,
633 F. Supp. 1564 (D. Mont. 1986); Baker v. Vanderbilt Univ., 616 F. Supp. 330,
331 (M.D. Tenn. 1985).
160. Personnel Adm'r of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
161. Wengler, 446 U.S. at 152-54; Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 688-90; J. NoWAK,
R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 24, at 725.
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asserted government interest) and the means (the classifica-
tion).162 Courts reject post-hoc rationalization for the classifica-
tion and require the government to demonstrate that it had the
particular policy in mind when it made the classification, that it
is not merely advancing the policy as an afterthought.163
Courts demand a "current articulation... refusing to supply a
challenged rule with a rationale... where the rationale is not
advanced in the litigation . . . ."164 Finally, if the challenged
rule rests on presumed congruence between the classification
and the asserted government interest that is not universally
true, courts sometimes afford the individual an opportunity to
rebut the presumption. 65
It is uncertain which rights will prompt the Supreme Court
to invoke intermediate tier scrutiny. 66 Although the interme-
diate tier originated in gender discrimination cases, the Court
has extended its use to other factual settings. For example, the
Supreme Court has applied intermediate tier scrutiny to classi-
fications affecting the right to education, 6 7 although it previ-
ously held that the same right does not trigger strict
scrutiny. 6 8 While it remains unclear which factors will prompt
application of the intermediate level of review, 16 9 it is neverthe-
less evident that the frontiers of this middle tier seem to be ex-
panding steadily.170 As the frontiers expand, courts are
162. J. NowAx, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 24, at 595, 722-23.
163. L. TRIBE, supra note 86, § 16-30, at 1083.
164. Id. § 16-30, at 1083.
165. Id. § 16-31, at 1088-89.
166. See Weidner, The Equal Protection Clause: The Continuing Search for
Judicial Standards, 57 U. DET. J. URB. L. 867, 910, 917 (1980).
167. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217-24 (1982).
168. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29-39 (1973).
169. Professor Laurence Tribe has attempted to identify the characterister-
ics of cases in which courts apply the intermediate level of equal protection
scrutiny.
Some cases of intermediate review combine sensitive criteria of
classification with important liberties or benefits. See, e.g., Hampton
v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976) (aliens deprived of federal civil
service employment) [additional citations omitted]. In other interme-
diate review cases, an important liberty or benefit is at stake but no
sensitive criterion is involved. See, e.g., Unites States Department of
Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973) (households containing de-
pendents of ineligible persons deprived of food stamps) [additional ci-
tations omitted]. And in still other intermediate review cases, a
sensitive criterion is involved but no independently important liberty
or benefit is at stake. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, [430 U.S. 762
(1977)] (illegitimates deprived of intestate inheritance).
L. TRIBE, supra note 86, § 16-31, at 1090-91 n.10.
170. For instance, in several recent cases courts have applied intermediate
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applying the middle tier not only when the classification affects
"sensitive" classes of persons, such as illegitmates, but also
when the classification impacts socially important, albeit non-
constitutional, interests. 7 1
B. THE APPROPRIATE TIER FOR ANALYZING THE VALIDITY OF
THE DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF CO-CONSPIRATORS'
AND GOVERNMENT AGENTS' STATEMENTS
As noted at the outset of this Article, 72 some commenta-
tors have suggested the possibility of applying the equal protec-
tion doctrine to evidentiary classifications. 7 3 These com-
mentators have assumed, however, that the applicable standard
of judicial review is minimal scrutiny.174 That assumption is
neither unavoidable nor sound.
A proponent of imposing a heavier burden of justification
on the government might argue that the group of criminal de-
fendants currently on trial is a suspect class, warranting appli-
cation of the highest tier of scrutiny. Case law, however, does
not support that argument. To date, the only groups that have
qualified as suspect classes have been unpopular minorities' 75
who are the objects of such intense community prejudice176
that they deserve special protection from the majoritarian polit-
ical process. 77 Courts appreciate that invocation of strict scru-
tiny is a drastic step because few classifications can pass muster
tier scrutiny to medical malpractice legislation on the theory that the victim's
right to recover damages for personal injuries has great social importance.
See, e.g., Coburn v. Agustin, 627 F. Supp. 983, 994-95 (D. Kan. 1985); Carson v.
Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 939-40, 424 A.2d 825, 835-36 (1980); Arneson v. Olson, 270
N.W.2d 125, 135-36 (N.D. 1978); Smith, Battling a Receding Tort Frontier: Con-
stitutional Attacks on Medical Malpractice Laws, 35 DEF. L.J. 359, 373-75
(1986). But see Baker v. Vanderbilt Univ., 616 F. Supp. 330, 332 (M.D. Tenn.
1985); Barme v. Wood, 37 Cal. 3d 174, 181-82, 689 P.2d 446, 451, 207 Cal. Rptr.
816, 821 (1984).
171. See supra note 169.
172. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
173. E.g., Bray, supra note 19, at 503-04; Note, supra note 19, at 179-80.
174. E.g., Bray, supra note 19, at 503-04; Note, supra note 19, at 179.
175. See New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 593 n.40
(1979) (citing inter alia Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886)).
176. E.g., State v. Plenty Horse, 85 S.D. 401, 405, 184 N.W.2d 654, 655-56
(1971) (Sioux Indian).
177. L. TRIBE, supra note 86, § 16-13, at 1012 ("The central concern has
been to root out any action by government which, in Justice Stone's phrase, is
tainted by 'prejudice against discrete and insular minorities,' the sort of preju-
dice 'which tends... to curtail the operation of those political processes ordi-
narily to be relied upon to protect minorities' in our society.") (quoting United
States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) (dictum)).
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under that standard. For that reason, courts are reluctant to
treat even definable groups as suspect classes under the equal
protection doctrine.178 Moreover, the cases are legion in which
courts have held that neither convicts' 79 nor ex-convicts 8 0 com-
prise a suspect class. Both of these groups wield less power and
are subject to more overt public hostility than the class of pres-
ently charged defendants. If those groups do not fall within the
definition of a suspect class, a fortiori the class of current de-
fendants does not.
It is more tenable to contend alternatively that strict scru-
tiny is apropos because the classification impinges upon a fun-
damental right to fair, evenhanded treatment in the criminal
justice system. In two equal protection cases, one in 1963 in-
volving the right to counsel on appeal and the other in 1956 re-
lating to the right to a transcript on appeal, the Warren Court
used broad language to describe a commitment to the ideal of
equality in the criminal justice system.' 8 ' Some leading consti-
tutional law scholars also take the position that under the equal
protection doctrine, there is "a 'fundamental right' to fair treat-
ment in the criminal justice system."'' 82 If such a general fun-
damental right exists, the differential treatment of co-
conspirators' and government agents' statements seemingly
trammels on the right.
The Burger Court, however, undermined the strength of
this argument by retreating from the broad language in the ear-
lier opinions. The Burger Court interpreted the earlier cases to
178. Id. § 16-29, at 1077 n.2.
179. E.g., Hrbek v. Farrier, 787 F.2d 414, 417 (8th Cir. 1986); McQuillion v.
Rushen, 639 F. Supp. 420, 424 (N.D. Cal. 1986); Paoli v. Lally, 636 F. Supp.
1252, 1266-67 (D. Md. 1986); Meredith v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd.
Dep't of Conservation, 19 Cal. 3d 777, 780-81, 567 P.2d 746, 747, 140 Cal. Rtpr.
314, 315 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1064 (1978). See also O'Brien v. Skinner,
414 U.S. 524, 530-31 (1974) (minimal rationality test applied to prisoner classifi-
cations challenged under the equal protection doctrine); McGinnis v. Royster,
410 U.S. 263, 270 (1973) (same).
180. E.g., Darks v. Cincinnati, 745 F.2d 1040, 1042-44 (6th Cir. 1984); Miller
v. Carter, 547 F.2d 1314, 1321 (7th Cir. 1977), affl'd, 434 U.S. 356 (1978); Upshaw
v. McNamara, 435 F.2d 1188, 1190 (1st Cir. 1970); Furst v. New York City
Transit Auth., 631 F. Supp. 1331, 1336-37 (E.D.N.Y. 1986); Kindem v. City of
Alameda, 502 F. Supp. 1108, 1111 (N.D. Cal. 1980); State v. Correll, 626 S.W.2d
699, 701 (Tenn. 1982).
181. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357-58 (1963) ("There is lacking
that equality demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment .... ."); Griffin v. Illi-
nois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) ("Such a denial is a misfit in a country dedicated to
affording equal justice to all and special privileges to none in the administra-
tion of its criminal law.").
182. J. NOwAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 24, at 818.
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mean only that without the counsel's helping hand or a record
of what transpired in the lower court, the formal opportunity
to appeal has little practical value.'8 3 The Supreme Court thus
has limited the earlier cases by recasting them as meaningful-
access situations in which differential treatment relates to such
a critical aspect of criminal procedure that the appellant was
denied effective access to the courts.
Taking their cue from the Supreme Court, the lower courts
have largely abandoned the rhetoric of equality in criminal pro-
cedure and speak rather in terms of a right to meaningful ac-
cess to the courts. 8 4 Several recent cases have applied minimal
scrutiny to differential treatment in criminal procedure. 85 If a
difference must effectively deny a defendant access to the
courts to trigger strict scrutiny, however, it seems strained to
argue that the difference between co-conspirators' and govern-
ment agents' statements has that effect. Denying the defense a
particular item of potentially exculpatory testimony hampers
the defense, but it hardly cripples defense advocacy to the same
extent as denying a criminal appellant counsel or a trial tran-
script. The difference may be only one of degree, but the dif-
ference is large and discernible. Thus, like the suspect class
argument, a strict scrutiny argument founded on a supposed
general fundamental right to nondiscriminatory criminal proce-
dure is flawed.
Nevertheless, the differential treatment of co-conspirators'
and government agents' statements implicates another right
that should be held fundamental: the criminal defendant's
right to present trustworthy, critical, exculpatory evidence' 8 6
183. See, e.g., Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 822-23 (1977); United States v.
MacCollum, 426 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1976); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 611-14
(1974); see also 2 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRMINAL PROCEDURE § 11.2(c), at
22-24 (1984) (noting cases holding that "alternative methods of reporting trial
proceedings," other than transcripts, would be "permissible" if they provided
an appellate court with "an equivalent report" of events at trial from which
appellants contention arose; also noting the Supreme Court's statement in
MacCollum that the basic question is one of "access to procedures for review");
L. TRIBE, supra note 86, § 16-36, at 1105 n.29, § 16-49, at 1118-19 (citing cases
reaffirming the principles of -rffin and Douglas).
184. E.g., Lane v. Correll, 434 F.2d 598, 600 (5th Cir. 1970).
185. E.g., United States v. Avendano-Camacho, 786 F.2d 1392, 1394 (9th Cir.
1986); Tarter v. James, 667 F.2d 964, 969 (11th Cir. 1982); Burnett v. Municipal-
ity of Anchorage, 634 F. Supp. 1029, 1039-40 (D. Alaska 1986); People v. Part-
ner, 180 Cal. App. 3d 178, 225 Cal. Rptr. 502, 505 (1986); People v. Garcia, 698
P.2d 801, 808 (Colo. 1985).
186. See Churchwell, The Constitutional Right to Present Evidence: Prog-
eny of Chambers v. Mississippi, 19 CRIM. L. BULL. 131, 139 (1983); Clinton, The
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In 1948, the Supreme Court referred generally to the right to
present a defense.'8 7 At the very least, that right guarantees
the defendant an opportunity to present both his version of the
facts and the testimony of witnesses. 8 8 Significantly, however,
the Supreme Court has extended that right to encompass an
opportunity to present critical, reliable evidence. In a 1967
opinion, the Court struck down state statutes rendering accom-
plices incompetent as defense witnesses. 8 9 The Supreme Court
held that the fourteenth amendment due process clause incor-
porates the sixth amendment compulsory process guarantee. 190
The Court then reasoned that as a necessary implication from
that explicit guarantee, the criminal defendant must have a
right to present pivotal, exculpatory testimony. Arguing reduc-
tio ad absurdum, the Court stated that it would be absurd to
guarantee defendants a right to subpoena witnesses while al-
lowing the state to apply "arbitrary rules that prevent whole
categories of defense witnesses from testifying on the basis of a
priori categories that presume them unworthy of belief."' 91
In a later decision, the Court applied this rationale to re-
verse a state court's hearsay ruling that had denied a criminal
defendant the opportunity to present critical, trustworthy evi-
dence.192 At least when the government agent's statement is
reliable and would provide vital support for the defense theory,
this rationale seems apposite to the exclusion of the govern-
ment agent's statements under the vicarious admission doc-
trine. The cases recognizing this defense right furnish a solid
Right to Present a Defense: An Emergent Constitutional Guarantee in Crimi-
nal Trials, 9 IND. L. REV. 713 (1976); Ponsoldt, Balancing Government Effi.
ciency and the Protection of Individual Liberties: An Analysis of the Conflict
Between Executive Branch "Housekeeping" Regulations and Criminal Defend-
ants' Rights to a Constitutionally Fair Trial, 19 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 349,
389 (1984).
187. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948) ("A person's right to ... an op-
portunity to be heard in his defense ... [is] basic in our system of jurispru-
dence ....").
188. People v. McCowan, 182 Cal. App. 3d 1, 227 Cal. Rtpr. 23, 29 (1986).
189. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23 (1967).
190. Id. at 17-19. The sixth amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to have compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favor .... ." U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
191. Washington, 338 U.S. at 22.
192. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (exclusion of testimony
concerning third party's confession to murder for which defendant is on trial
constitutes denial of fair trial in violation of due process under the fourteenth
amendment); see Imwinkelried, Chambers v. Mississippi, - U.S. - (1973):
The Constitutional Right to Present Defense Evidence, 62 MIL. L. REv. 225
(1973).
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basis for concluding that the differential treatment of co-con-
spirators' and government agents' statements adversely affects
a fundamental right implicitly protected by the Constitution.
Doubt arises only because, as previously stated, the Justices
are still troubled by the question of the extent to which a right
must be textually guaranteed before it can be deemed "funda-
mental."193 The Supreme Court could conceivably hold that
purely implied rights-rights lacking any explicit recognition in
the text of the Constitution-do not qualify as fundamental in-
terests deserving strict scrutiny protection. Even if the Court
were to do so, however, it would be hard pressed to avoid apply-
ing the intermediate tier of scrutiny to the differential treat-
ment of co-conspirators' and government agents' statements.
On the one hand, the Court would undoubtedly balk at
characterizing defendants as a sensitive class. The logical con-
sequence of that characterization would be that virtually every
classification in the criminal justice system would be subject to
at least middle tier scrutiny. The cases applying minimal scru-
tiny to criminal procedure classifications sub silentio reject the
characterization. 194
On the other hand, it is patent that the defendant's right to
present reliable, pivotal evidence is an important one. In decid-
ing whether to apply the middle tier, the Supreme Court con-
siders the social importance of the affected interest.195 The
Court itself has found that the interest in federal civil service
employment is of sufficient magnitude to warrant invoking the
intermediate tier.196 A number of federal 97 and state' 98 cases
have held that the right to recover damages in a civil action for
193. See supra text accompanying notes 151-54.
194. E.g., United States v. Avendano-Camacho, 786 F.2d 1392 (9th Cir.
1986); Tarter v. James, 667 F.2d 964 (11th Cir. 1982); People v. Partner, 180
Cal. App. 3d 178, 225 Cal. Rptr. 502 (1986).
195. See L. TRIBE, supra note 86, § 16-30, at 1082.
196. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 102-03 (1976); L. TRIBE,
supra note 86, § 16-29, at 1082 n.18.
197. E.g., Coburn v. Agustin, 627 F. Supp. 983, 994-95 (D. Kan. 1985); Doran
v. Priddy, 534 F. Supp. 30, 37 (D. Kan. 1981).
198. E.g., Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 871-72, 555 P.2d 399,
411-12 (1976), cert denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977); Johnson v. Saint Vincent Hosp.,
Inc., 273 Ind. 374, 391-92, 404 N.E.2d 585, 596-97 (1980); Carson v. Maurer, 120
N.H. 925, 939-40, 424 A.2d 825, 835-36 (1980); Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125,
135-36 (N.D. 1978); Smith v. City of Philadelphia, No. J-14-86 (Pa. Super. Ct.
Oct. 3, 1986) (as summarized in 55 U.S.L.W. 2206-70, Oct. 21, 1986). See Smith,
supra note 170, at 373-75; Comment, Limitation on Recovery of Damages in
Medical Malpractice Cases: A Violation of Equal Protection?, 54 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1329, 1338-43 (1986).
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personal injuries is of sufficient social importance to warrant
middle tier scrutiny.
Finally, the Supreme Court's 1974 decision in Davis v.
Alaska199 provides powerful authority for treating the defense
right to present critical evidence as a trigger for middle tier
scrutiny. In Davis, the defendant was charged with burglary.
The star prosecution witness was a person named Green. At
the time of the trial, Green was still on probation as a juvenile
delinquent for burglary. The state juvenile court statutes were
construed to preclude the defense from questioning Green con-
cerning his probationary status so as to impeach Green for bias.
The Court held that, as applied, the state statutes unconstitu-
tionally denied the defendant his right of confrontation of wit-
nesses under the sixth and fourteenth amendments.20 0
Admittedly, the Court in Davis analyzed the statutes under
the confrontation clause and did not invoke the implied defense
right to present evidence.201 The decision nevertheless indi-
cates the great weight the Court attaches to the defense inter-
est in presenting crucial testimony to the jury. Although Chief
Justice Burger's majority opinion conceded that the state had
an "important"20 2 interest in preserving the anonymity of juve-
nile offenders, the Court held that the defense's interest in de-
veloping all relevant facts at trial was "paramount. '20 3 Using
these decisions as benchmarks, a criminal defendant's right to
present reliable, exculpatory evidence should at minimum de-
serve the protection of the intermediate level of scrutiny.
IV. THE VALIDITY OF THE CLASSIFICATION OF CO-
CONSPIRATORS' AND GOVERNMENT AGENTS'
STATEMENTS UNDER THE MIDDLE
LEVEL OF EQUAL
PROTECTION SCRUTINY
To be constitutionally valid under the intermediate level of
equal protection scrutiny, the differential treatment of co-con-
spirators' and government agents' statements must be substan-
tially related to achieving an important government interest.20 4
To determine whether this test is satisfied, this final section de-
199. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
200. Id. at 315-21.
201. Id. at 315.
202. Id. at 319.
203. Id.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 159-64.
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scribes and critiques the justifications that have been advanced
to rationalize the classification.
A. THE JUSTIFICATION FOR THE CLASSIFICATION
It is somewhat difficult to reconstruct the case for the dif-
ferential treatment of co-conspirators' and government agents'
statements. Most of the cases after Santos merely cite Santos
without elaborating on the reasons for that case's holding.205
Occasionally a court following Santos embellishes by asserting
that Santos distinguished between the two types of statements
for unspecified "[r]easons of policy."20 6 Rather than developing
their own rationales for the rule, courts rely on Santos's prece-
dential value. Unfortunately, the Santos opinion itself is hardly
a model of lucid judicial reasoning.20 7
Nevertheless, on rereading Santos, it is reasonably clear
that the Second Circuit relied on several lines of argument to
rationalize treating government agents' statements differently
than those of nongovernment agents'. The Second Circuit im-
plicitly recognized that the rationale for the vicarious admission
doctrine is that in an adversary system, it is fair to impute an
agent's out-of-court statements to the party-opponent, although
the statements technically may be hearsay. 208 The court then
articulated the factors that, in its view, made it improper or un-
fair to attribute a government agent's statements to the prose-
cuting sovereign.
One factor is that the government agent is "supposedly un-
interested personally" in the outcome of the prosecution.20 9
Although the court did not explain why this factor justifies ex-
cluding the agent's statement, it implicitly invoked the follow-
ing line of reasoning. If the agent were disinterested, he might
not share the motivation of the prosecuting sovereign. The
common interest or motivation of principal and agent works in
205. E.g., United States v. Kampiles, 609 F.2d 1233, 1246 (7th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 954 (1980); United States v. Pandilidis, 524 F.2d 644, 650
(6th Cir. 1975), cert denied, 424 U.S. 933 (1976); United States v. American Cy-
anamid Co., 427 F. Supp. 859, 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
206. E.g., United States v. Powers, 467 F.2d 1089, 1095 (7th Cir. 1972) (citing
United States v. Santos, 372 F.2d 177, 180 (2d Cir. 1967)), cert denied, 410 U.S.
983 (1973).
207. The court's lack of clarity may be due in part to the parties' failure to
brief and argue fully the question of the justifications for the differential treat-
ment. See Brief for Appellee at 6-8, and Brief for Appellant at 4-8, United
States v. Santos, 372 F.2d 177 (2d Cir. 1967).
208. Santos, 372 F.2d at 180.
209. Id
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favor of the sincerity of most statements admitted under the vi-
carious admission doctrine.210 Lacking that insurance of sincer-
ity, a government agent's statement, therefore, should not fall
within the doctrine.
Another factor is that government agents have "histori-
cally [been] unable to bind the sovereign." 211 When a court ad-
mits a government agent's statement as evidence against the
government, to a degree the court is binding the government by
the agent's action. Applying the vicarious admission doctrine to
the statement would violate the historical tradition of the
agent's inability to bind the sovereign.
Later apologists have listed other factors in support of the
Santos rule. For example, one factor is the size and diversity of
the government. The sovereign entity encompasses "a variety
of diverse and often conflicting interests."212 Many government
agents have little or no law enforcement responsibility. These
agents may not understand the implications of their statements
for their employer qua prosecuting sovereign. 213 The agents'
lack of understanding makes it unfair to saddle the prosecution
with their statements.
Furthermore, a contrary rule would interfere with the gov-
ernment's ability to investigate crimes. 214 Unlike the defense,
the government has a duty to the public to investigate crimes.
If government agents' statements constituted vicarious admis-
sions by the government, law enforcement agents conducting
investigations might become too chary in what that say and do.
Investigators might cautiously pause to consider every word. A
contrary rule would thus endanger the public interest in ag-
gressive, vigorous crime investigation.
Professor McCormick urged one last theory to support the
Santos rule: "the desirability of affording the Government a
measure of protection against errors and indiscretions on the
part of at least some of its many agents."215 By granting the
government a measure of protection against its agents' errors,
the Santos rule helps ensure the reliability of the evidence ad-
mitted at trial.
210. Note, supra note 65, at 406.
211. Santos, 372 F.2d at 180.
212. United States v. AT&T Co., 498 F. Supp. 353, 357 (D.D.C. 1980).
213. Note, supra note 65, at 406.
214. IM at 413-14.
215. MCCORMICK, supra note 9, § 267, at 795.
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B. AN APPRAISAL OF THE SOUNDNESS OF THE JUSTIFICATIONS
A governmental classification must pass a two-pronged test
to withstand intermediate tier equal protection scrutiny. The
first prong requires the asserted government interest underly-
ing the classification to be "important. 216 Concededly, at least
one of the rationales advanced in support of the Santos rule-
that its abolition would interfere with crime investigation 2 17 --
rests on an indisputably important interest. The tenor of the
Supreme Court's fourth amendment decisions since the early
1970s indicates that the Court attaches great and growing im-
portance to the government's interest in vigorous crime investi-
gation.218 It is assumed, therefore, that the importance of this
asserted interest will enable the classification to survive the
first part of an equal protection inquiry.
The pivotal focus thus becomes the second prong: the suita-
bility of the classification as a means to achieving the govern-
mental end.2 1 9 One might make a tenable argument that
abolishing the Santos rule would impede the conduct of govern-
ment crime investigations. Government investigators obviously
have to make statements during investigations. If overturning
Santos would make government agents unduly cautious in con-
ducting investigations, the public interest in diligent crime in-
vestigation might be harmfully affected. The question resolves
itself into whether overruling Santos would have a substantial
impact on that interest.
The Santos rule, however, is irrelevant to much of what
government agents do during crime investigations. The pur-
pose of an investigation is to collect evidence from outside
sources. Abandoning Santos certainly would not restrict gov-
ernment agents' ability to listen. Of course, in many instances
the private sources consulted during crime investigations do not
volunteer information to the authorities; the authorities must
question them. Again, however, Santos is irrelevant. Questions
216. See supra text accompanying notes 159-61.
217. See Note, supra note 65, at 413-14.
218. See generally Gilligan, "Continuing Evisceration of [the] Fourth
Amendment," 14 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 823, 824 (1977). This article analyzes the
trend suggested by the Supreme Court in its 1975 fourth amendment cases. In
all nine of its 1975 fourth amendment cases, the Court reversed state or lower
federal court decisions suppressing evidence. In the ninth case, Justice Mar-
shall dissented stating, "Today's decision is the ninth this Term marking the
continuing evisceration of Fourth Amendment protections against unreasona-
ble searches and seizures." Id-
219. See Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 23, at 346-50.
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asked by government investigators-interrogatory sentences-
generally do not fall within the hearsay definition anyway.220
Santos is pertinent only when the investigators make assertive
statements that would otherwise constitute hearsay.
The most troublesome situation occurs when the investiga-
tor makes a false assertive statement, as when the investigator
lies to one being interrogated to dupe her into divulging infor-
mation. Assertive statements can fall within the hearsay defini-
tion.221 It is doubtful, however, that even in this situation,
jettisoning Santos will have any noticeable effect. Suppose that
the defense offers the investigator's statement for the truth of
the assertion. If the investigator had a compelling reason to lie
as an interrogation tactic, the investigator should be able to ar-
ticulate that reason and explain why the statement is false. De-
nied the immunity conferred by Santos, the investigator is still
likely to make the statement in the field-and then at trial to
testify to the reason for resorting to that interrogation ploy.
The entrapment 222 and fifth amendment voluntariness 223 doc-
trines also attach a species of penalty to misleading statements
made by government agents to suspects. Yet, no empirical evi-
dence indicates that those doctrines have created significant
disincentives to crime investigators. In short, although this ar-
gument satisfies the important interest prong of middle tier
scrutiny, the argument fails the substantial relationship prong.
Of course, the classification might be constitutionally valid
if it is substantially related to achieving another important gov-
ernment interest. In their landmark article on the equal pro-
tection doctrine, Professors Joseph Tussman and Jacobus
tenBroek use the terminology of Trait and Mischief.224 The
Mischief is the social evil that the government action is calcu-
lated to eliminate. The Trait is the characteristic that the gov-
ernment chose as the dividing line in its classification. In this
220. See FED. R. EVID. 801(a)-(c); R. CARLSON, E. IMWINKELRIED & E.
KIONKA, supra note 6, at 422-27 (hearsay rule applies only to assertive state-
ments that are formally or functionally declarative sentences; the rule is inap-
plicable to interrogatory sentences).
221. Note that even here, however, the defendant may sometimes have a
nonhearsay theory for admitting the evidence when the defense wants to show
the falsity of the statement rather than the truth of the assertion. See, e.g.,
Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211 (1974).
222. E.g., United States v. Pena, 527 F.2d 1356, 1361 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
426 U.S. 949 (1976).
223. See E. IMWINKELRIED, P. GIANNELLI, F. GILLIGAN & F. LEDERER, CRIM-
INAL EVIDENCE 314-18 (1979).
224. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 23, at 346.
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context, the Mischief is the exclusion of valuable, probative
hearsay when it would be fair to impute the hearsay statement
to the party-opponent. The Trait chosen as the dividing line in
Santos is the status of party-opponent; the hearsay may be ad-
mitted against a private party-opponent, but not against the
prosecution, a government entity. Viewed in these terms, the
classification is classically underinclusive.225 The government
has at least as much, and arguably more, control over its agents
as the defendant has over his co-conspirators. 22 6 Because the
government probably has greater control over its agents, the
government should have at least the same evidentiary responsi-
bility as the defendant. It is just as "fair to receive" 227 the
statements against the government as it is to admit them
against the defendant. The classification is consequently under-
inclusive because it stops short of eliminating all the Mischief;
it still permits the exclusion of some hearsay when it would be
fair to attribute the hearsay to the party-opponent.
It is true that courts frequently uphold underinclusive clas-
sifications.228 Such classifications, however, are not automati-
cally valid under equal protection doctrine. Rather, courts
often sustain such classifications because sound reasons fre-
quently justify the underinclusivity.229 For example, eliminat-
ing the entire Mischief might necessitate government action on
a large scale. If so, administrative convenience favors proceed-
ing step-by-step to eradicate the problem piecemeal.2 30 Fur-
thermore, it may be unclear whether the means selected are at
all effective to eliminate the problem. Before prescribing a so-
lution that may inadvertently compound the Mischief, the gov-
ernment may experiment with part of the Mischief. Finally,
the Mischief might affect a particular industry or class of per-
sons most adversely, and the government may properly con-
clude that the best use of finite government resources is to hit
the Mischief "where it is most felt."231 All of these considera-
tions, however, are absent here. Rewording Federal Rule of
Evidence 801(d)(2) will not require a mammoth government ef-
225. Id. at 348 ("All who are included in the class are tainted with the mis-
chief, but there are others also tainted whom the classification does not
include.").
226. See Oakley, supra note 30, at 14-15.
227. Mueller, supra note 11, at 333.
228. L. TRIBE, supra note 86, § 16-4.
229. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 23, at 349, 372.
230. Id. at 349.
231. Id- at 372.
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fort. There is nothing experimental about the vicarious admis-
sion doctrine. The defense is hit just as hard as the prosecution
by the loss of probative evidence.
Nor can other asserted justifications for the differential
treatment save the classification from unconstitutionality.
Judge Bazelon has remarked that the government's argument
based on its agents' disinterestedness is "difficult to grasp. '2 32
His remark may be a euphemism for observing that the as-
sumption of disinterestedness is formally and practically false.
If the government agent carelessly makes a statement that ulti-
mately leads to an acquittal, he risks losing his job.233 Even
when performing law enforcement duties, a government agent
has some exposure to statutory and constitutional tort liabil-
ity.234 Moreover, the assertion that government agents are dis-
interested is pointedly undermined by such problems as
prosecutorial misconduct 235 and vindictive prosecution. 236 Con-
gress itself has perceived the reality. The legislative history of
Federal Evidence Rule 803(8) indicates that Congress forbade
the prosecution from offering certain police reports under the
official record hearsay exception because Congress was skepti-
cal of the impartiality of the officers preparing the reports.237
In other contexts, courts routinely treat government agents
as the defendant's adversaries. The American Bar Association's
232. United States v. Morgan, 581 F.2d 933, 937 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
233. See Note, supra note 65, at 411.
234. Malley v. Briggs, 106 S. Ct. 1092 (1986) (holding that a police officer
will be held to a "reasonably well-trained officer" standard in determining
whether probable cause existed and that if the officer presented a magistrate
with a complaint and affidavit which failed to establish probable cause, the of-
ficer may be liable for causing an unconstitutional arrest under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Nar-
cotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (holding that narcotics agents were liable for acting
in violation of the fourth amendment).
235. See generally B. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT (1986) (Us-
ing "misconduct" to describe a prosecutor's attempt to take unfair advantage
over the accused and otherwise prejudice his rights, this treatise discusses the
problem as it occurs in every stage of the criminal justice process.).
236. See United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368 (1982) (suggesting that a
defendant in an appropriate case might prove objectively that the prosecutor's
charging decision was motivated by a desire to punish the defendant for doing
something that the law plainly allowed him to do, thus violating due process
and ultimately discouraging would-be vindictive prosecutors); Blackledge v.
Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974) (holding that due process precluded North Carolina
from substituting a more serious charge for the original one in response to de-
fendant's invocation of his statutory right to appeal).
237. See generally Alexander, The Hearsay Exception for Public Records in
Federal Criminal Trials, 47 ALB. L. REv. 699 (1983) (analyzing both the con-
ceptual background and legislative history of Rule 803(8)'s exclusions).
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Disciplinary Rules, for example, prohibit certain types of con-
tact between one's client and the adversary's attorneys.
238
Courts have applied that prohibition to prosecutors.23 9 Further-
more, there is now respectable authority that the vicarious ad-
mission doctrine applies against the government in civil
litigation.240 The Santos court itself stated in dictum that the
result would have been different if the case had been a civil
trial rather than a prosecution.241 No one can argue seriously
that government agents are interested in the outcome of a case
when the prospect is a money judgment against their employer
but not when the possibility is an acquittal of someone who has
flagrantly violated laws promulgated by the employer. On bal-
ance, the only realistic conclusion is that government agents
are interested in the outcome of prosecutions on which they
have worked. For that reason, there is at least as strong a guar-
antee of the agents' sincerity as there is of the sincerity of co-
conspirators.
The argument based on government agents' historical in-
ability to bind the sovereign is as flawed as the theory that gov-
ernment agents are disinterested. Posing the general question
whether an agent can "bind" the government is not useful. No
one is proposing that thq government agents' statements serve
as a basis for imposing civil liability or criminal responsibility
on the agent or the government. Any reliance on the sovereign
immunity doctrine is therefore misplaced.242 Nor is anyone
238. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-104 (1981)
(prohibiting a lawyer from communicating directly with a party he knows to
be represented by a lawyer about the subject of the representation without
prior consent of the other lawyer). See also id DR 5-101(B) (prohibiting a law-
yer from acting as both an attorney and a witness in the same matter).
239. E.g., United States v. Batchelor, 484 F. Supp. 812, 813-14 (E.D. Pa.
1980) (prohibiting assistant United States attorney from interviewing defend-
ant without having obtained prior consent of defendant's previously retained
counsel); United States v. Gold, 470 F. Supp. 1336, 1351 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (prohib-
iting prosecutor from acting as both prosecutor and witness in grand jury pro-
ceedings); United States v. Treadway, 445 F. Supp. 959, 960 (N.D. Tex. 1978)
(same).
240. See, e.g., United States v. AT&T Co., 524 F. Supp. 1331, 1333-34 (D.D.C.
1981) (Department of Defense study concluding that divestiture of the Bell
system would be harmful to national security held admissible); Burkey v. Ellis,
483 F. Supp. 897, 911 n.13 (N.D. Ala. 1979) (government agent's inconsistent
out-of-court statements made in the course of exercising his authority and
within scope of that authority held admissible and binding upon agent's princi-
pal in civil cases).
241. United States v. Santos, 372 F.2d 177, 180 (2d Cir. 1967).
242. See Note, supra note 65, at 409-10.
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proposing an estoppel against the government. 243 The modest
proposal is that the statement be usable as an evidential admis-
sion.24 In other factual settings, courts routinely permit state-
ments by government agents to have even greater impacts on
prosecutions. A government agent's statement may render a
defendant's confession involuntary,245 create an entrapment de-
fense 246 or consummate a legally enforceable plea bargain.247 If
those legal consequences can flow from a government agent's
statement-when the government can be "bound" in those re-
spects-by parity of reasoning the statement should qualify as
admissible evidence against the prosecuting sovereign.
Similarly, any rationale based on the size of the govern-
ment is fallacious. The thrust of this argument is that it would
be unfair for courts to apply the vicarious admission doctrine to
statements by every type of government agent, including those
without law enforcement responsibilities, because many of
these agents will not understand the impact that their state-
ments can have on a prosecution. The argument mistakenly as-
sumes that courts will apply the vicarious admission doctrine
indiscriminately to all government agents. The doctrine can be
limited to law enforcement agents such as police and prosecu-
tors.248 These agents have an identity of interest and motiva-
tion with the prosecuting sovereign.24 9 Another weakness in
the argument is that it proves too much. In the words of Judge
Harold Greene, the argument "would apply with equal force to
any large organization with many individuals speaking and act-
ing on its behalf. Were the Court to accept the government's
reasoning, all such organizations would effectively have to be
exempted from the purview of the rule on party-opponent ad-
missions."2 50  Indeed, in the case in which Judge Greene
penned those words and in which the government made that
243. Younger, supra note 17, at 108.
244. For a discussion of the distinction between judicial admissions (admis-
sions in pleadings and which are not evidence at all) and evidential admissions(e.g., statements of a party offered in evidence), see MCCoRMIcK, supra note 9,
§ 262.
245. See E. IMWINKELRIED, P. GIMNNELLI, F. GILUGAN & F. LEDERER, supra
note 223, at 315-17 (discussing government agents' coercive techniques, includ-
ing threats, promises and inducements).
246. E.g., United States v. Pena, 527 F.2d 1356, 1361 (5th Cir.), cert denied,
426 U.S. 949 (1976).
247. E.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
248. Note, supra note 65, at 401, 407.
249. Id at 414.
250. United States v. AT&T Co., 498 F. Supp. 353, 358 (D.D.C. 1980).
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argument, the litigant opposing the government was the Ameri-
can Telephone and Telegraph Company.25
1
The final argument in favor of the existing classification is
McCormick's contention that the Santos rule gives the govern-
ment a measure of protection against errors by its agents.
252
Indisputably, the Santos rule has that effect; the argument ac-
curately describes the operation of the Santos rule. As a justifi-
cation for the differential treatment of co-conspirators' and
government agents' statements, however, the argument misses
the point. The issue is not whether the rule gives the govern-
ment additional protection against errors. Rather, the issue is
whether the government needs or deserves more protection
from errors than the defendant.
It is implausible that the government needs more protec-
tion than the defendant. Co-conspirators may be pathological
liars and they frequently have self-serving reasons to misstate
the conspiracy's membership and aims.253 The government has
presumably exercised some care in hiring its agents. Addition-
ally, after hiring its agents, the government can exercise more
formal and practical control over their conduct than one con-
spirator has over the conduct of co-conspirators.
The crux of the debate should be whether, as government,
the prosecution deserves more protection from errors than the
defense. It would be absurd to deny that the prosecution de-
serves some protection from such errors. Admission of errone-
ous statements at trial results in a risk that the ensuing fact-
finding will be in error, and government has an important
stake in accurate fact-finding. Nevertheless, that is the same
stake that every litigant has by virtue of his status as a litigant
in the adversary system. Like the prosecution, the defense has
a vital stake in accurate fact-finding. The Supreme Court has
recognized the defense's interest in accurate fact-finding by
fashioning a confrontation clause requirement that prosecution
hearsay be reliable. 25 In the final analysis, asserting the gov-
ernment's right to protection from error is merely another way
251. Id.
252. McComIucK, supra note 9, § 267, at 795.
253. See supra text accompanying notes 49-50.
254. See Lee v. Illinois, 106 S. Ct. 2056, 2063 (1986) (citing Dutton v. Evans,
400 U.S. 74 (1970) (evaluating the trustworthiness of hearsay admitted under
Georgia's expanded co-conspirator hearsay exception)); Imwinkelried, The
Constitutionality of Introducing Evaluative Laboratory Reports Against Crim-
inal Defendants, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 621, 629-35 (1979) ("the constitutional re-
quirement of reliability").
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of saying that the government has a legitimate stake in trust-
worthy fact-finding. That stake, however, cannot serve as a jus-
tification for the classification because as litigants in an
adversary system, both the defendant and the prosecution have
the identical stake.
The conclusion that follows from this analysis is that the
differential treatment of co-conspirators' and government
agents' statements is violative of equal protection. The classifi-
cation might survive scrutiny for minimum rationality because
some of the arguments favoring the classification, particularly
the supposed impact on crime investigations, are neither ridicu-
lous nor self-contradictory. The classification, however, must
be tested by a more demanding level of scrutiny because of the
importance of the right on which it impinges. If courts apply
strict scrutiny, the classification will suffer the same fate as
most classifications tested under that tier and will be quickly
invalidated. Even if courts apply middle tier scrutiny, the clas-
sification should fall. All the arguments advanced to justify the
classification relate to legitimate state interests and some would
probably qualify as important interests under the middle tier
standard. Nevertheless, in each argument, the relationship be-
tween the classification and the asserted interest is either non-
existent or extremely dubious. In each case, the ends-means
relationship is too tenuous to withstand even middle tier
scrutiny.
At the very least, courts should use the middle tier tech-
nique of affording the defendant an opportunity for rebuttal.2 55
The defendant should be permitted to rebut the supposed un-
fairness of imputing a government agent's statement to the gov-
ernment by showing that the statement is trustworthy and
critical. The agent's substantial identity of interest with the
government is a guarantee of sincerity; and when the surround-
ing circumstances otherwise show the statement's reliability, an
imputation is eminently fair in terms of hearsay policy.
CONCLUSION
Although equal protection doctrine may invalidate the clas-
sification of co-conspirators' and government agents' state-
ments, it would be a mistake to leap to the conclusion that the
doctrine will revolutionize evidence law. As Part II of the Arti-
cle emphasized, the critical step in equal protection analysis is
255. See L. TRIBE, supra note 86, § 16-30, at 1088, § 16-32, at 1092.
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often the resolution of the question whether a classification ex-
ists. 256 The equal protection guarantee strikes out at classifica-
tions of persons, not of things. As a consequence, the guarantee
is likely to have limited impact on American evidence law.
The Santos rule is one of the few contemporary evidentiary
doctrines under which the admissibility of evidence turns on
the identity of the proponent of the evidence.257 Such eviden-
tiary doctrines are the rare exception rather than the general
rule. In most cases, whatever the identity of the proponent of
the evidence, the foundational requirements for admitting the
evidence and the possible objections to admission remain the
same. It is true that under the equal protection clause, courts
sometimes invalidate facially neutral laws that have a disparate
impact on a particular class of persons.2ss Courts ordinarily do
so, however, only when the disparate impact compels a finding
of discriminatory intent 259 and it would be difficult for a de-
fendant to prove that an evidentiary rule was inspired by such
an intent. Courts will probably hold that the run-of-the-mill
evidentiary doctrine is invulnerable to equal protection analysis
because no classification of persons exists to trigger the equal
protection guarantee.
In a sense, it is only fitting that the application of the equal
protection guarantee to evidentiary doctrine be so limited. Even
256. See supra text accompanying notes 81-113.
257. Privilege law may be another area vulnerable to equal protection at-
tack. By cloaking some relationships with protection while withholding it
from others, privilege law arguably makes classifications of persons. See Port
v. Heard, 764 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1985) (failing to recognize privilege of parents
while recognizing marital privilege does not deny equal protection); In re Lif-
schutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 467 P.2d 557, 85 Cal. Rtpr. 829 (1970) (failing to recognize
absolute psychotherapist-patient privilege while recognizing absolute clergy-
man-penitent privilege does not deny equal protection).
258. See Blattner, supra note 92, at 786 (citing Village of Arlington Heights
v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), and Washington v. Da-
vis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)).
259. Id. See also United States v. Lulac, 793 F.2d 636, 646 (5th Cir. 1986)
(fourteenth amendment violated only if state purposefully discriminates
against minorities by requiring college students to pass skills test before sched-
uling more than six hours of professional education courses at any state col-
lege or university); Berry v. Phelps, 639 F. Supp. 1515, 1517 (E.D. La. 1986)
(petitioner, a convicted murderer scheduled for execution, unable to get
habeas corpus relief unless able to "show strong evidence of discriminatory in-
tent;" proof of disparate impact not sufficient); Government of Virgin Islands
v. Kramer, 636 F. Supp. 458 (D.V.I. 1986) (fourteenth amendment not violated
absent proof that selective enforcement of law that monitors admission to pre-
trial intervention program was deliberately based on an unjustifiable standard,
such as race or religion).
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if so limited, the guarantee still can be used to strike down the
evidentiary classifications that are the most antithetical to the
adversary system. A leading apologia for the adversary litiga-
tion system is the 1958 Report of the Joint Conference of the
American Bar Association and Association of Law Schools.260
That report underscores that a key tenet of the adversary sys-
tem is that both litigants must stand on equal footing before
the judge. If the adversaries realize that they stand on equal
footing, all sides have the same incentive to collect evidence
before trial and to attempt to introduce the evidence at trial.261
Equalizing the incentive level for all the litigants ideally results
in the fullest factual record at trial and the most thorough air-
ing of the issues in the case. Professor Younger captured an es-
sential characteristic of the adversary system when he stated
that at trial, "the rules of the game [should] be the same for
both. '262 The equal protection doctrine can be a powerful
weapon against evidentiary doctrines that, like the Santos rule,
introduce asymmetries into the adversary system.
At this point, some might question the description of the
equal protection doctrine as a "powerful" tool. In principle, the
doctrine is not necessarily a potent theory for winning the ad-
mission of evidence such as statements by government agents.
Once the court finds a violation of equal protection, the govern-
ment can remedy the violation by either granting the benefit to
all similarly situated persons or by denying it to all.263 Trans-
lated into this setting, the government may remedy the equal
protection violation by admitting the government agents' state-
ments or by banning both those statements and those by co-
conspirators. Thus, it is theoretically possible that the ultimate
effect of overturning Santos will be the exclusion of both types
of evidence-arguably to the detriment of reliable fact-finding
in criminal trials.
This scenario overlooks the realities of the criminal justice
260. Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A.
J. 1159 (1958). The late Lon Fuller was one of the report's principal drafters.
261. See generally Thibaut, Walker & Lind, Adversary Presentation and
Bias in Legal Decisionmaking, 86 HARV. L. REV. 386 (1972) (presenting find-
ings of an experiment designed to compare the different modes of presenting
evidence between the adversary and inquisitorial systems).
262. Younger, supra note 17, at 108.
263. See Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112(1949) ("Invocation of the equal protection clause, on the other hand, does not
disable any governmental body from dealing with the subject at hand. It
merely means that the prohibition or regulation must have a broader impact.")(Jackson, J., concurring); M. FORKOSCH, supra note 80, § 464, at 550.
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system. In general, the government has much greater investi-
gative resources than the defense.2 64 The prosecution is much
more likely to possess evidence of an inculpatory statement by
a co-conspirator than the defense is to have proof of an excul-
patory statement by a government agent. Furthermore, prose-
cutors have long regarded the co-conspirator hearsay exception
as a sheer necessity.26 5 As long as the government enjoys a
marked superiority in investigative resources and views the co-
conspirator exception as an essential prosecution weapon, the
only feasible cure for the unconstitutionality of the classifica-
tion will be admitting the relevant evidence on both sides. In
practice and in theory, the equal protection doctrine thus can
be a valuable tool for those who strive for greater coherence
and consistency in American evidence law.
266
264. See Goldstein, The State and the Accused Balance of Advantage in
Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149 (1960).
265. See Levie, supra note 49, at 1164, 1166; Oakley, supra note 30, at 45;
Note, supra note 35, at 1309; Note, supra note 33, at 1310.
266. One last question about the impact of the equal protection doctrine
may be nagging the reader: What impact can the doctrine have on evidentiary
rules beyond the effect of the implied sixth amendment right to present evi-
dence? At first, it might seem that it will never be necessary to resort to the
doctrine because any rule violative of equal protection would necessarily run
afoul of the implied sixth amendment right. The equal protection analysis will
differ from the sixth amendment analysis in one respect, however, and may
differ from it in a second respect.
First, the equal protection guarantee may be applicable even when the de-
fense evidence in question is not critical to the defense theory. The language
in Chambers suggests that the sixth amendment right is operative only when
the defense evidence is pivotal or crucial to the defense case. Chambers v.
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973); Churchwell, supra note 186, at 139-41; Im-
winkelried, Constitutional and Statutory Theories for the Admissibility of De-
fense Evidence, in SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL DEFENDING CRIMINAL CASES: A
PRACTICAL LOOK AT CURRENT DEVELOPiENTS IN CRIMINAL LAW 419, 435-36
(1979). The Court may indeed limit strict equal protection scrutiny to cases in
which the defense evidence is critical. Yet the Court can apply intermediate
tier scrutiny if it finds the classification impinges on an "important" defense
right. Criticality is a step beyond mere importance; if the Court is using both
terms in the normal sense, evidence is critical when it is "specially important."
WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 267 (1979). As equal protection anal-
ysis evolves, the Court may find that the defense has a sufficiently important
interest in presenting any reliable, excuplatory evidence. The equal protection
guarantee would thus have a broader scope than the sixth amendment protec-
tion.
Second, in the cases in which both guarantees come into play, the equal
protection test is stricter and more predictable. Under the implied sixth
amendment right, when defense evidence is demonstrably reliable and critical
to the defense theory, the defense is prima facie entitled to introduce the evi-
dentP Tmvinkelried. supra. at 419. 435-36. Under the case law, however, the
sixth amendment analysis contains an additional step.
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[Tihe judge must apply a balancing test, weighing the defendant's in-
terest in a fair trial against the specific policy served by the compe-
tence rule. Although Davis indicates that the judge should attach
great weight to the defendant's interest, it is by no means a foregone
conclusion that every competence rule... must yield to the right to
present defense evidence.
Id. at 437. The degree of uncertainty is substantial because the judge is balanc-
ing intangibles.
The judge may have less latitude under an equal protection analysis. If
the judge applies middle tier scrutiny, the judge inquires only whether the end
served by the classification is important and whether the classification is sub-
stantially related to the end. If the judge concludes that the classification fails
either prong of the test, the judge must strike down the classification. Thus, if
the judge concludes that the end-means relationship is tenuous, the classifica-
tion falls; the judge may not uphold the classification on the theory that, on
balance, the end is so important that it outweighs the defense interest in
presenting the evidence.
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